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Abstract

Mahmoud Abbas’s 2011 attempt to obtain Palestinian statehood through the
United Nations challenged the status quo “Middle East peace process” by offering
an alternative solution to the system of bilateral negotiations that has otherwise
been stagnant for much of the last decade. Since Salam Fayyad became prime
minister in 2007, the Palestinian Authority has been actively working towards
building institutions that would serve as the foundation for the future State of
Palestine. International accolades for Fayyad’s initiative garnered far-reaching
support to facilitate the state-building program.
In the six years since then, the Palestinian Authority has developed the institutions
that are necessary for Palestine to become a state of its own. In reality, however,
the Palestinian Authority has not evolved into the de facto state that Fayyad’s
program had intended it to. This is largely due to the fact that Israel has not
sufficiently minimized its occupation of the West Bank, inadvertently placing a
glass ceiling on the Palestinian Authority’s ability to further develop its
institutions.
The purpose of this research is to provide a better understanding of post-intifada,
post-Arafat Palestine by analyzing the capacity of its institutions to function on a
level comparable to other states. This research identifies specific criteria
attributed to statehood, utilizing the cases of Israel and Kosovo to illustrate the
role that institution building and support from the international community plays
in obtaining recognition as a sovereign state. It also identifies the state-building
programs enacted by the Palestinian Authority to demonstrate how the
institutional capacity of the Palestinian Authority has evolved since the
conclusion of the second intifada.
This research argues that the most accurate to measure a state is by assessing the
existence of institutional infrastructure and the ability of state institutions to carry
out the functions of a state. This research concludes that if Israel lifted its
draconian restrictions in the West Bank and the U.S. also began to actively
support the state-building programs, Palestine could sufficiently exist and a
sovereign and independent state.
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Introduction
On May 14, 1948, the day that the British Mandate in Palestine was set to expire,
the Jewish People’s Council convened in Tel Aviv to declare the independence of
the State of Israel. In a proclamation of independence, David Ben-Gurion
declared: “by virtue of our natural and historic right and on the strength of the
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the
establishment of a Jewish state…to be known as the State of Israel.”1 Four
decades later, the Palestine National Council petitioned the UN Security Council,
proclaiming: “The Palestine National Council hereby declares…on behalf of the
Palestinian Arab people, the establishment of the State of Palestine in the land of
Palestine.”2 Still seeking independence, Palestinian Authority President
Mahmoud Abbas returned to the UN in 2011, petitioning the United Nations for
recognition as a sovereign state. The issue of Palestinian statehood is still
unresolved.
The parameters for peace established in Oslo in the early 1990s are no
longer sufficient to fulfilling a two state-solution solution. The al-Aqsa intifada
of the early 2000s left an indelible mark in the eyes of the Israeli public that the
Palestinians were an existential threat that ought to be feared. Repeated conflicts
between Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Israel continue to validate the assumption
1

“The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel May 14, 1948.” Official Gazette, No.
1, 14 May 1948.
2
U.N. Security Council and U.N. General Assembly, 43rd year. “Resolution A/43/827 and
S/20278, Agenda item 37 [Question of Palestine].” 18 Nov. 1988. From State of Palestine
Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations. Official Record, New York 1988.
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that Palestinians are not to be trusted. For the Palestinians, the continuation of
peace talks without implementation of any solutions indicates the current Israeli
government is not a willing partner for peace and that the situation on the ground
will remain the status quo so long as this is the case. The unsustainable nature of
the current status quo in the current environment of the Middle East necessitates
that the “peace process” be looked at from a different angle. In order for a new
series of negotiations to start, however, both parties need to be equally seated at
the negotiating table.
State-building within the Palestinian Authority is the most pragmatic
alternative to bilateral talks under the current negotiations regime. For the last six
years the Palestinian Authority has actively worked to reform the government
apparatus in the West Bank to establish legitimacy and credibility as a capable
state. A genuine assessment of the institutional capacity of current Palestinian
state would provide a baseline from which new negotiations could begin, absent
of the political and religious dogma that has mired any attempts at finding a
resolution to this point in time. For the purpose of this research, the institutional
capacity of a state is measured by the development of an administrative
framework for executing government operations that allow state institutions to
function, even at the most minimal level. This research will argue that the
Palestinian Authority has developed an institutional framework that is sufficient
to establish a state, however, the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the
West Bank and the lack of support from the international community has
precluded the Palestinian Authority from reaching its full potential. Analyzing

7

the current state of affairs in Israel-Palestine from this perspective will provide an
alternative point-of-view that eliminates some political morass that has stalled the
resolution of the conflict to this point in time. While there is an abundance of
scholarship relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the vast majority of that
scholarship analyzes the current conflict predominately through the paradigm
established in Oslo. This research will seek to expand into a more contemporary
paradigm of analysis that assesses Palestinian statehood based on technical
capacity of state institutions rather than power politics. By looking a the capacity
of the current Palestinian Authority and the future Palestinian state, scholars and
policymakers will be challenged to reconcile the perpetuation of an asymmetric
status quo with an earnest exercise of self-determination.
This research will begin with a theoretical study of state-building by
looking at classical theories of statehood as well as contemporary scholarship and
legal precedent for state creation. Analyzing the theoretical basis of statehood
will determine the criteria commonly attributed to statehood. This section will be
supplemented by case studies of states that emerged from conflict by establishing
the institutional capacity of state entities before petitioning the UN for recognition
as independent states. This research will look at Yishuv Israel and Kosovo to
demonstrate how state-building was implemented, as well as well as to show the
role the international community played in supporting the institutions that were
necessary for emerging states to succeed. The second portion of this research will
look at the institutions of the Palestinian Authority and the framework for the
continued development of the Palestinian Authority into a full-fledged state. This

8

section will be supported with primary sources to make the argument that the
Palestinian Authority has the institutional framework to evolve into a sovereign
state. The third section of this research will look at external assessments that
indicate how developed Palestinian developed Palestinian institutions actually are.
This research will conclude by arguing that, despite internal and political flaws
enigmatic of all modern states, the Palestinian Authority has the potential to
govern as a sovereign state through the development of state institutions begun
under Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. The perpetuation of an Israeli occupation
that limits Palestinian potential, as well as the absence of supportive leadership
from the international community, however, are impassable barriers that have
precluded a state from developing, and will continue to do so if the status quo is
sustained in perpetuity.

9

PART I: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Classical Thought
The modern concept of a state came into being with the Peace of Westphalia in
1648 when international norms began to recognize states, rather than feudal and
monarchal systems, as sovereign entities for the first time. The new international
system established by this treaty determined that self-determination, territorial
integrity, and legal parity between nation-states were some of the key pillars of
statehood, and this system is still used today.3 Since then, scholars from myriad
schools of thought have expounded upon the original tenets laid forth at
Westphalia—state sovereignty and territoriality—to better understand the identity
of states in the international system. This section would look beyond state
sovereignty and territorial integrity to understand how authoritative power is
established within a state and how specialization of authoritative duties is
specialized within a bureaucratic system of governance. By looking at theories of
statehood, this section will determine the components that distinguish states from
other entities.

Marx and Durkheim: The Economy of a State
One school of thought regarding statehood is based in economic principles of
state structure and was originally articulated by Karl Marx. According to Marx,
the framework of a state, both structurally and legally, is derived from the

3

Hassan, Daud. “The Rise of the Territorial State and The Treaty of Westphalia.” Yearbook of
New Zealand Jurisprudence. Vol. 9, 2006: 62-70.
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economic foundation of society, particularly illustrated in the bureaucratization of
government administrations that manage and allocate state resources.4 This is
because the state as an early institution of governance arose out of production and
economic activity.5 Prior to large-scale industrialization, societies were structured
around feudalism and had a limited capability to engage in far-reaching trade and
commerce.6 As administrative entities developed the capability to manage and
allocate resources, governments consolidated power that allowed a state-like
structure to emerge as a central apparatus in economic management
One of the benefits of Marx’s analysis is that he understands the concept
state development from an economic baseline that represents a dependent
variable, an attribute that can be easily compared from one state to another.
Another important attribute of a state is its political structure, but due to the
uniqueness of individual polities, the political structure serves as an independent
variable that is best used to understand the distinct make-up of a state when
comparing one state entity from another.7 By understanding the distribution of
resources as an economic baseline and dependent variable when comparing states,
Marx argues that the sovereignty of a state is determined by the degree of its
control over the access to and distribution of particular resources.8 In the
operation of the state itself, the two resources that Marx argues are necessary for a
state to control is the bureaucracy and the use of force—both through military and
4

Badie, Bertrand, and Pierre Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1983: 3.
5
Morrison, Ken. Marx, Durkheim, Weber: Foundations of Modern Social Thought. London:
SAGE Publications, 2006: 128.
6
Ibid.
7
Badie and Birnbaum, 4.
8
Ibid., 5
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policing.9 Control over the civilian bureaucracy in particular is important because
the bureaucracy is the instrument that the government of a state uses to determine
how specific goods and services are distributed.10 The creation of a political
superstructure arises as a distribution mechanism, leading to the centralization of
political authority within the administration of the state, based on a ruling elite
that takes on the role of exclusively controlling some of the means of
production.11 This exclusive control, in the state sense, is seen as an exertion of
authoritative control that a state would want to possess to be successful over other
state entitites. By maintaining exclusive control over the bureaucracy, the state
retains its independence from both internal and external actors who might
otherwise try to use the bureaucratic system to challenge the authority of the state.
Another school of thought argues that within the superstructure of the state
is the distribution of labor within society. This idea was made popular by Emile
Durkheim who explored Marx’s ideas of dividing labor within the material,
economic-based paradigm of the state, by looking at the development of a central
‘governing organ’. By dividing labor between different levels of society,
Durkheim argued that society becomes specialized as different functions and
responsibilities of the state distributed to the most capable actors. With the state
taking on an increasing number of new and diversified functions, additional
responsibilities necessitate that centralization simultaneously take place to
9

Ibid., For the purpose of this research, a more in-depth analysis of the control on the monopoly
of force will be provided by Max Weber.
10
This resulted in the politicization of society, leading to the development of political parties that
determined how state resources would be distributed. For the sake of brevity, this research will
not look at the direct effects of the politicization of society, but this is certainly a topic that is
pertinent to Palestinian statehood and could merit further research in the future.
11
Morrison, 130-132.
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promote a unity of effort by the different bureaucratic actors of the state. 12 The
division of labor, from Durkheim’s perspective, enabled a functional state to
emerge within the economic-based framework of a state that was argued by Marx.
While Marx suggested that the control over the distribution of resources
within the bureaucracy institutionalized central authority, Durkheim added
another element of state development by correlating the functionality of the
bureaucracy to the legitimacy of the administration of the state. The states who
are able to centralize power and constitute a powerful administrative apparatus are
the most successful.13 In addition to the economic theory proposed by Marx, the
necessity of specialization through the division of labor, and the centralization of
power in a governing apparatus, as argued by Durkheim, also leads to the creation
of a modern state.

The Weberian State
One of the most fundamental principles of statehood, according to the work of
political scientist and sociologist, Max Weber, is the exercise of a monopoly of
force by the state. In his essay Politics as Vocation, Weber argues “ultimately,
one can define the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific means
peculiar to it…namely, the use of physical force.”14 He goes on to say “a state is
a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use

12

Badie and Birnbaum, 11-14.
Ibid., 12.
14
Weber, Max. “Politics as Vocation.” By From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Eds. H. H.
Gerth and C. Wright Mills. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946): 77-78.
13
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of physical force within a given territory.”15 To understand the state in more
definite terms, Weber argues that it is not what institutions are attributed to a
state, but how those institutions are unique to the state system. The legitimate
claim to the use of force in particular, is a criterion necessary for a state to be
considered a state because it is something exclusive to individual states. This is
necessary to possess because it retains sovereignty in the central government,
preventing competing entities from undermining the central authority of the state.
The use of force is an enforcement mechanism that prevents the state from falling
into anarchy.16
In addition to a monopoly on the use of force, the second clause to
Weber’s definition of a state suggests that a state also has to be able to exercise
authoritative force in a “given territory.” This is an essential attribute of a state
because it determines what physically constitutes a state, geographically, as well
as who constitutes the citizens of that state. This is important as it establishes the
parameters of a states authority. Weber refers to this as organized domination
whereby the government administration of a state claims legitimacy of its rule and
demands obedience from a population.17 In order for a state to be able to claim
dominion over a particular territory, the government administration needs to have
the capacity to “control the personal executive staff and the material implements
of administration,” which Weber suggests is possible through a monopoly on the
use of force.18 The Weberian model of a state, which is still used to understand

15

Ibid., 78.
Ibid.
17
Ibid., 79.
18
Ibid., 80.
16
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statehood today, indicates that territorial integrity, authoritative domination
(sovereignty), and legitimacy derived from the power to implement authority are
all components of a state and are all derived from the basic prerequisite of
claiming a monopoly of the use of force.

Tocqueville
Of classical state theory, nothing has been arguably more influential in
understanding the institutions necessary for statehood than the successful
independence of the United States and the eventual evolution of a democratic
society there. In his work Democracy in America, notable political scientist
Alexis de Tocqueville recounted his observations in American governance in the
mid-nineteenth century. To differentiate between the ancien regime of old
monarchies and the new era of republics, Tocqueville observed centralization of
power and the subordination of aristocracy to democracy as two attributes of a
new democratic state. When considering the Palestinian question, it is important
to understand some of the core principles of democracy because the current
international system is arguably more welcoming to fledgling democracies than
other regimes and a future Palestinian state would benefit from being democratic
in nature so that it does upset the balance of global power.
Centralization of authority is an important attribute of a state because it
acts as a mechanism that allocates power between the rulers and the ruled.
According to Tocqueville, “a nation [cannot] enjoy a secure or prosperous

15

existence without a powerful centralization of government.”19 Tocqueville
argues that centralization of authority is necessary because the antecedent to
centralization is multiplicity of power centers within a society, which will
ultimately compete with one another for authority. As a result, a state will be
unable to enforce the rule of law and there will be a decreased incentive for the
general public to adhere to authority.20 To ensure that a central governing
authority does not become despotic, however, Tocqueville distinguishes between
centralization of the government and centralization of the local administration.
While the centralized government represents the aggregate interests of a
population, the local administration reflects the individual interests of a local
polity.21 This is an important distinction to make in a democratic system because
it retains power in both national and local authority apparatuses while also
allowing for a degree of autonomy between localities, checking the central
government from completely subduing local interests. Tocqueville’s writings
regarding the centralization of power within a state are important because it
allocates supreme authority to a singular apparatus while simultaneously
decentralizing political power to provincial governments. This is important for the
Palestinian case because centralization of power eliminates the potency of
competing factions that otherwise fragment the Palestinian polity and undermine
its capacity to declare independence.

19

Tocqueville, Alexis De. Democracy in America: Volume 1. Trans. Henry Reeve. Kindle.
Location 1574.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid., location 1562.
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Tocqueville lays the foundation for the modern democratic state in his
writings by underscoring the importance of centralized power and authority to
create obedience within a populace, while also illustrating how this is represented
by the exercise of self-determination within polities. In order to be democratic, a
modern state of Palestine would need to have a high degree of institutional
capacity within its national and local government administrations, measured by
the political will of individual Palestinians and their ability to use local
governance to check the power of the central government authority.
The criteria that the early theorists recognized as important hallmarks that
distinguish a state from a non-state are important because these criteria contribute
to the argument of developing the institutional capacity of the state. As argued by
Marx and Durkheim, a state needs to have a superstructure that, while largely
dictated by economic principles in their writings, has the capacity to regulate and
manage resources, consolidate power in a central bureaucracy, and allow that
bureaucracy to divide labor and specialize administrative tasks. Weber
supplements this by arguing that a state needs to possess a monopoly on the use of
force so that it can act as an implementation mechanism while also acting as an
attribute wholly unique to states. Finally, Tocqueville argues that a centralized
administrative government is essential particularly in democratic regimes,
because the government is also tasked with distributing power between leaders
and their constituents. While on-going scholarship continues to reassess the
concept of statehood, these criteria today act as the foundation for understanding
why some entities are states and others are not.
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Contemporary Theory
Classical theorists distinguished what made a state a state by identifying
institutional attributes, like the bureaucracy and the military, which enable the
state to emerge as a separate entity from society. In doing so, the classical
theorists laid the foundation for the basis from which states ought to claim their
sovereignty, as well as the role that institutions play in organizing the state
system. With the emergence of new states out of post-conflict zones in the
twentieth century, theorists began to codify and delineate the criteria that states
ought to possess in order to be seen as sovereign entities. This process began with
the Montevideo Convention in the 1930s and the definition of statehood still
continues to be debated through precedent and theoretical scholarship.

The Montevideo Criteria
In 1933, the International Conference of American States met in Montevideo,
Uruguay to discuss the definition of statehood.22 The Montevideo Convention
concluded with the signing of a treaty that laid forth four criteria for what
constitutes a state in international law. The first article of the treaty enumerated
the four “Montevideo criteria”: permanent population; a defined territory;
government; and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.23 Although
these criteria are not universally accepted and continue to be debated, the

22
23

Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 Dec. 1933.
Ibid.
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Montevideo criteria continue to be used as benchmarks of statehood in the current
era largely due to the absence of an alternative way of looking at statehood state.24
In the post-World War II international order, international organizations
have started to play a larger role in determining what consists as a state. While
the criteria established in Montevideo determine statehood by declarative means,
the constitutive theory of statehood argues that international consensus also plays
a role.25 The constitutive theory of statehood argues that in order for international
law to recognize a state as a state, other states also need to consider the state as a
state.26 The United Nations in particular has become a forum for states to obtain
constitutive recognition. Although UN recognition in and of itself does not make
a state a state, those who are full members of the United Nations are recognized as
states, supporting the assertion that the constitutive theory of statehood is relevant
when assessing emerging states today.27 In the present international order, state
institutions, the benchmarks established in Montevideo, and peer recognition of
states in the United Nations are the main criteria used to distinguish states from
other entities.

Fukuyama: Defining Institutional Capacity
Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the primary challenge of the
international system was absorbing newly independent states from the

24

Grant, Thomas. “Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents.” 37
Colum. J. Trasnat’l L. 403 1998-1999.
25
Raphael Ahern, “Is Palestine a state? That may depend on the Palestinians,” The Times of Israel,
December 12, 2012.
26
Ibid.
27
Grant, 446.
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decolonized world. In the 21st century this is no longer the case as the period of
decolonization has come to an end. Rather, the primary challenge of the present
era is the proliferation of failed and failing states that destabilize volatile regions
of the world and harbor non-state entities that are threats to international security.
Aside from enumerating specific criteria for statehood, another way to understand
whether or not Palestine could be a state is to understand the Palestinian
Authority’s capability to govern through the lens of failed and failing states. By
looking at the capability of state institutions to function, one can discern whether
or not a Palestinian state can satisfactorily operate independently, making the case
that a sovereign Palestine would benefit, rather than burden the current
international system.
An accurate method to measure a state is to determine its scope and
strength. According to political scientist, Francis Fukuyama, the institutional
capacity of a state is determined by the scope and strength of the government
apparatus. The scope of a state is defined by the level of its activity in deriving
laws and policies, and the strength of a state is understood by the states ability to
actually execute and implement laws and policies.28 State institutional capacity is
a good metric for distinguishing between satisfactory states and failing states
because it demonstrates how well a state is able to not only execute sovereignty
within its own borders, but also the degree to which a state can interact with other
states in the international system. In the case of Palestine, determining the scope
and strength of the Palestine Authority would make the case as to whether or not

28

Francis Fukuyama, “The Imperative of State-Building,” Journal of Democracy (April 2004):
21-22.
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the Palestine can function as an independent state, and whether or not it would
enter the international fraternity of states in good standing.
The institutional capacity of a state is a sufficient metric for understanding
whether or not a state, particularly an emerging state like Palestine, is able to join
the international system of states because such capacity can be determined by
both external and internal indicators. Good state functions, such as effective
administration, government transparency and accountability, and the ability to
enforce laws, as well as state maladies, such as corruption, are regularly
monitored by international agencies. As Fukuyama notes, organizations like
Transparency International, Freedom House, and the World Bank, aggregate data
regarding specific aspects of state strength and scope that are translated into
indices that allows for a state-by-state comparison.29 In determining whether or
not a virtual state, like Palestine, is able to execute full independence, external
indices reflect how capable its institutions are in exercising good governance,
according to contemporary norms of statehood.
In addition to external indices and reports, internal demand for institution
building and reform is also important in discerning the state’s institutional
capacity. Fukuyama argues that in cases where there is an absence of internal
demand for domestic institutional reforms, foreign donors may apply pressure or
an outside occupying force may intervene to develop the institutions necessary to
effectively govern. Conversely, he argues that a state that can generate sufficient
internal demand for institutional development is more successful in exercising full

29

Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2004): 10-11.
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sovereignty than a state that cannot.30 This is an important metric, particularly for
the case of Palestine, because it measures the support an emerging state has for
developing capable state institutions. States that are on the verge of failure will
arguably necessitate the intervention of external actors to keep the state from the
brink of total collapse. Determining the demand for institutional development and
reform in the Palestinian Authority will establish a metric for understanding
whether or not external forces are needed to support the state, indicating the
degree to which an independent Palestine could exercise its own sovereignty.
State theory has evolved from the age of nineteenth century political
philosophy where states were only just beginning to emerge from archaic
monarchial empires. In the modern era of the state-centered internal order,
measuring the ability of a state to adequately function as a state has become the
accepted norm for determining which entities are states and which are not. It is
for that reason that this research seeks to understand the issue of Palestinian
statehood from a lens of institutional capacity rather than political paradigms or
even social movements. Understanding institutions and reforms to improve the
functionability of such institutions will give the most accurate and least biased
assessment as to whether or not the Palestinian Authority is capable of
functioning as a sovereign state. The follow sections will look at cases of states in
the making and how they obtained international recognition of statehood.
Utilizing a case study analysis will indicate how these theories were implemented,
and particularly, how the maturation of the functions of state institutions
eventually lead to the recognition of the state.
30

Ibid., 35-36.
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PART II: CASE STUDIES

While it is important to recognize the emergence of state theory and some of the
key tenets of statehood, it is more important to understand how theses theories
were applied. This research will look at two cases, Israel and Kosovo, to further
illustrate the application of state theory in areas with conditions similar to the
current situation in Palestine. Israel serves as a good case study because it
demonstrates that statehood did not necessarily emerge at a vote in the UN, but
that decades of building Jewish institutions in spite of both the Arab inhabitants in
Palestine and the British mandatory government gave the Jews the credibility to
argue that they needed—and were ready to manage—a state of their own.
In a more contemporary context, Kosovo is also a good case study too
look at when trying to understand the Palestinian issue because Kosovo sought
independence out of an asymmetric conflict, much like the Palestinians today, and
they unilaterally declared their own independence after decades of state-building
by the UN, NATO and other European-led efforts. This is an important study to
look at because it shows the potential of the UN to engage in guided statebuilding by acting as the guardian of state-status seeking entities that may or may
not have the ability to become a state on their own volition. More importantly,
this example shows the role recognition from the international community plays
in determining how a state obtains the official recognition as a state,
demonstrating how internal politics within the UN system can determine the fate
of a state’s status, irregardless of their own capabilities to function as a viable
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state. Both of these examples provide an insight into the Palestinian issue by
illustrating how states become recognized as states and how state theories are
implemented in the state-building process. They also show that developing the
institutional capacity of their respective pre-state entities was important to
obtaining international recognition that would allow Israel and Kosovo to join the
international regime of states.

Israel

The Israeli Yishuv: “State in the Making”
The Israeli Yishuv is an example of how economic, social, and political
institutions enabled the State of Israel to become fully independent. The case of
Israel is unique because it is shows an evolution from theory and concepts of the
state, to the creation of institutions through a “state in the making” paradigm, and
finally to the point where a strong state was produced and formally recognized by
the world order. What also makes Israel an interesting case to look at is the way
in which statehood was achieved through quasi-governance. While many modern
states realized independence through revolution and military coups, Israel was a
beneficiary of British colonial support. This analysis of the Israeli Yishuv will be
broken down into three parts in order to show the progression of state-building
within Mandatory Palestine until the declaration of statehood in 1948. The
evolutionary progression of the development of an independent Jewish state will
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show how Israel was successful, as well as provide a precedent for other
endeavoring states to follow.

Zionism and Socialism
Understanding the ideological framework from which a state emerges lays the
foundation through which civil society, the bureaucracy, and administrative
apparatuses develop and function. According to Baruch Kimmerling aside from
the technical dimension of statehood—through administrative and bureaucratic
mechanisms—a state also requires an identity dimension that reflects on the
collective identity of the inhabitants of a society and the character of the civil
society that eventually emerges.31 The impetus for Jewish emigration to the
British Mandate of Palestine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
can be found in political Zionism. At a time when European states were
consolidating under ethnic and national identities, the disparate Jews of Europe
also wanted to have their own territorial homeland. More than anything, the Jews
of Europe wanted to create their own nation and become a normalized entity in
the world order of that time.32 Persecution and pogroms had left an indelible
mark on Jewish collective identity and many Jews believed that collective
security could only be attained through a sovereign state.33 Theodor Herzl, the
father of the Zionist movement, came to a consensus with his colleagues that
Israel should come into being in the Jews’ ancient homeland—Palestine.34 This
territory served two purposes: on the one hand it was a symbol of religious and
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Jewish-ethnic identity that would bridge the spatial divides that separated the
Diaspora, and on the other, Palestine was a defined territorial space through which
a sovereign Jewish nation could establish its own political entity.35 The collective
history of the Jewish people and their ancestral connection to the land of Palestine
thus gave the political Zionist enterprise a base of legitimacy.36 The tradition of
self-determination and political sovereignty in Europe imposed itself on the
Jewish Diaspora, necessitating the creation of a political entity unique to the
Jewish people but also assimilating into the growing world order of nationstates.37 Political Zionism as an idea created a movement that lead to active
organization and politicization of the creation of a Jewish nation-state in
Palestine.
While political Zionism laid the groundwork for political and national
organization of the Jewish people, socialism served as the economic and social
tool through which the infantile Jewish settler community began to organize in the
early twentieth century. Labor was especially important to the Jewish settlers that
came from Eastern Europe and Russia during the second aliya. The kibbutzsystem was a direct contribution of those Jews who settled during this time and
eventually became an early template for communal governance.38 The focus on
community in the Jewish narrative made it possible to organize labor and
resources, and gave the Jews a stake in the success of their endeavor. The idea of
these Labor Zionists was to make the Jewish settlers part of the land of Palestine
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and to make the land of Palestine part of them.39 In this regard the Jews were to
become an integral part of the immigrant enterprise in Palestine.
Aside from the ideological-Marxist ideals of socialism that were supported
by some of the Jewish immigrants, socialism as a framework for distributing
resources and allocating labor was also important in achieving an autonomous
Jewish state. Some settlers believed that the only way to truly have a
distinguishable Jewish state was through economic autonomy. Avenues to
achieve this separation not only included Marxist socialism, but also the
economization and productivization of the Jewish population.40 Socialism
provided an ideological framework for the mobilization of both manpower and
resources.41 The necessity of structured order and division of labor in a socialist
community required the Jewish immigrant community to create institutional
organizations that could make this happen. While the land of Palestine was still
under Ottoman rule the Jews were developing institutions and communal system
of governance that carried through to the British Mandatory period.42

Institutions of the Yishuv
For both the political and socioeconomic dreams of the early Zionist movement
leaders in the British Mandate of Palestine to be achieved, an institutionalized
framework had to be built. On the international level, the World Zionist
Organization (WZO) was the broad reaching umbrella that joined the Diaspora to
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the settler community in Palestine.43 The WZO endowed the Jewish settler
community with the international support and financial resources it needed to
survive. One extension of this role was the through the Jewish National Fund.
The Fund was maintained by support from Jews in the Diaspora and was the
backbone of land purchases by Jewish settlers in Mandatory Palestine. More
importantly the ability of the Jewish settlers to purchase land enabled the Jewish
political Zionist movement to consolidate power territorially within the early
Yishuv.44 The ability of the Jews to purchase land in this organizational
framework was elemental when it came to the consolidation of Jewish power into
a coherent Jewish political national center because it gave them de facto presence
and legitimate claim to territory.45
While the Jewish National Fund (JNF) enabled the Jews to consolidate
power, it was the Jewish Agency, the executive branch of the WZO, which
affirmed Jewish political control within the Yishuv itself. The British Mandate in
Palestine recognized the desire for the Jews to establish their own national
homeland, and made provisions for that in the terms of the Mandate. The Jewish
Agency was subsequently created to assist the British in matters regarding the
Jews of the Palestine, as well as to give the WZO a direct extension relating to its
own interests in the Yishuv.46 The legal authority for the Jewish Agency was
found in Article 4 of the Mandate directly stating that the Jewish Agency would
act as an intermediary advising body to the British administration, both in
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Palestine as well as in London.47 Unlike the Arab natives of Mandatory Palestine,
the Jews were given a provision of authority that was devolved directly from
British rule. This provision made the Jewish Agency a quasi-governmental
organization with advisory powers to the British colonial rulers, and gave the
Jewish leadership a form of legitimacy it needed to hold rules binding over the
Yishuv population.48 The Jewish Agency was tasked with the role of being both
the diplomat and the overseer of economic development. In this manner the
Agency conducted negotiations, organized immigration, and guided economic
development in the Yishuv.49 The fact that the Jewish Agency was a diplomatic
partner to the British colonial government, and had the means to manage both
human capital and economic development enabled the Agency to gain legitimacy
on a national level.
The other main national institution that emerged within Mandatory
Palestine was Knesset Israel. Where the Jewish Agency was a subsidiary of the
World Zionist Organization, Knesset Israel was the legal recognition of the
Jewish community in Palestine by the British government, as well as the national
authority over Jewish governing organizations.50 The main role for Knesset Israel
was to serve as a platform for political competition between competing parties, as
well as managing its own governing bodies that paralleled the framework of the
WZO. Enabling competition amongst political parties, as well as providing the
medium through which British power could devolve through, meant that Knesset
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Israel became a staple institution in the Jewish political center.51 Recognition of
Knesset Israel by subsidiary parties and periphery organizations endowed Knesset
Israel with a basis of legitimacy that individual parties acting on their own
interests would have lacked.52 Knesset Israel acted as an institution that
broadened consensus and formulated the political agenda of the emerging Yishuv
government.
Aside from the formal institutions that were created by the British and
supported by the Diaspora, the Jews in the Yishuv also created informal
institutions that governed aspects of daily life. These institutions were critically
important because they imposed measures of social control on the population.
Joel Migdal argues that social control by those who govern the rules of the game
in society is a key attribute that leads to the crystallization of the state and the
development of effective state capabilities once a state has been formed.53 One
such institution that proved to be a key actor in the evolution of the Yishuv and
the consolidation of power was that of political parties, particularly the Labor
Zionist party, Mapai. Political parties were important to the development of the
Yishuv because the existence of political parties preceded that of society itself.54
Peter Medding notes that the political parties that developed in the Yishuv were
“united by a common goal of national independence and political sovereignty to
enable them to operate…on the basis of power sharing.”55 This shared national
aspiration helped shape the civil society that emerged in the Yishuv. A unique
attribute of the political parties of the Yishuv was that they voluntarily
51
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participated in Knesset Israel, and that they shared power in a system that
patterned after consociational governance.56
Although the political parties had to compete with one another for
influence as well as broker coalitions with one another, Mapai was able to forge a
path ahead of all the others due to its connection with the Labor movement.
Labor was harnessed by early Yishuv immigrants to cultivate the land and
develop communal systems of governance. Once these systems were in place
there grew a need for capital as the settler community expanded. Dependant on
the patronage of JNF funding, the Labor Zionists used the control of labor to
create the capital necessary to create jobs for the settler population.57 The
development of parties within the Labor movement had been created with the
intent to control and manage resource allocation as well as capital. Other parties,
most notably from the Revisionist camp, lacked the resources to control that
would have made it more competitive with Mapai. Mapai developed the
organizational framework and rules of the game that made it a leading institution
with the Yishuv’s political system.58
The Labor movement continued to be the basis through which other
institutions became focal power players in the Yishuv, particularly through the
national union or the Histadrut. The Histadrut was founded in 1920 around an
institutional framework that promoted political labor considering industrial labor
was largely nonexistent in the Yishuv.59 The Histadrut not only managed labor
and employment concerns of workers, but it also provided services like healthcare
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and education, and became a player in determining policy of social services.60
Under Mandatory rule, the function of Histadrut as a national union as well as a
provider of social services in the Jewish community made it indispensable.
Institutions with a vital importance had to be carefully controlled by the leaders of
the Yishuv.61 The Jews knew that the British both wanted to lay the foundation
for a Jewish state in Palestine, however in the 1920s it became apparent that
control would pass over to the majority population of Mandatory Palestine.62 The
Jews were a minority compared to the indigenous population, thus this change in
British policy posed a significant risk to the continued existence of the Jewish
enterprise in Palestine. The Histadrut proved to be a critical organization that
would project Jewish power and influence despite the obvious demographic
disadvantage it faced vis-à-vis the Arabs. Baruch Kimmerling argues that the
“ability to mobilize Jews in Palestine and in the Disapora for political ends” was
one of two necessary preconditions for the Yishuv to be a viable political entity in
Mandatory Palestine.63 The Histadrut embodied the ability of the Jews to
organize and mobilize, as well as provide services for the Jewish community that
were otherwise absent under British rule.
A final institution that solidified Jewish strength and semi-autonomy in the
Yishuv was Haganah. While Kimmerling noted that mobilization for political
ends was fundamental to Jewish self-determination and political autonomy in
Mandatory Palestine, the other prerequisite for the success of the Yishuv was an
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institutionalized power that could produce organized violence.64 Haganah was
created in 1920 at the same time the Jews were realizing that their continued
existence through the British was uncertain. The WZO especially did not trust the
British Mandatory government to be the exclusive guarantor of Jewish security.
Haganah was created under the auspices of colonial rule and formally became an
instrument of security for the political center of the Yishuv.65 After the Arab
Revolt in the 1930s, Haganah experienced a dramatic paradigm shift that moved it
more towards a professional army and away from the decentralized local outfit
that it had been during the 1920s.66 Like Histadrut in the labor sector, Haganah
became important because it was an institution that mobilized manpower,
particularly in matters of defense and national security.67 The most important role
of Haganah in the Yishuv, however, was the fact that its centralized existence
challenged the monopoly on force that the British had otherwise held. With these
institutions the Jewish political center was able to consolidate power that would
enable it to become the natural successor of governance over Palestine once the
British Mandate expired.
The Israeli state came into existence, not because of a vote in the United
Nations, but rather, because the institutions of the Yishuv period had been welldeveloped prior to 1948. The institutions that were part of the Yishuv maintained
a mechanism of force, managed the allocation of resources, particularly labor, and
served as functioning bureaucratic organs that managed Jewish society. The
power-sharing structure that had emerged in the communal governance of the
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Yishuv made it possible for the Yishuv institutions to consolidate their own power
under the newly emerged Israeli state. Although the main focus of this research is
not the politicization of societies, a distinguishing factor between the Jews in the
Yishuv period and the Palestinians today is the degree to which political will is
encapsulated in communal identity. For the Jews, developing a political process
within Mandatory Palestine led to the growth of independent institutions, making
Israel a unique case in this regard. Nonetheless, the Yishuv period serves as a
model for successful state-building because it showcases the institutional
characteristics a strong, functioning state needs to possess, as well as the political
dimensions that are also part of the state-building process.

Kosovo
With the collapse of the Soviet empire, a multitude of new states emerged in
Central and Eastern Europe. The dissolution of Yugoslavia was particularly
violent as archaic ethnic tensions surfaced in the contest for independence. In the
Former Yugoslavia, Kosovo had been a semi-autonomous region of Serbia that
was home to both Serbs and Albanians. Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to power
increased Serb nationalism, empowering Serb minorities to fight for the
realization of “Greater Serbia,” the emanation of a Serb ethnic homeland, which
also consequentially included Serbs within Kosovo.68 Under Milosevic, Serbia
claimed the Albanian-majority territory of Kosovo as part of Serbia, revoking the
autonomous status that had previously been held by Kosovars under Yugoslav
68

Michael Dziedzic, “Kosovo,” by Twenty-First Century Peace Operations, Eds. William J.
Durch (Washington, DC: Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 2006): 323.

35

rule.69 The 1995 Dayton Accords did not address the emerging conflict between
Serbia and Kosovo, with war eventually breaking out between the two sides.
NATO intervened in 1999, paving the way for NATO, the UN, and other
international organizations to begin a decade-long state-building program in
Kosovo.70
For the purpose of understanding Palestine’s current quest for
independence, Kosovo is a good case study to analyze because it is an example of
how international tutelage can build the institutions needed for a future state to
succeed. The UN and NATO were two of the most instrumental international
organizations guiding the state-building program in Kosovo because they
established Kosovo’s administrative and security institutions, respectively. In the
beginning of the conflict, NATO was instrumental in consolidating armed militant
groups, particularly the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and recognized a new
security force, the Kosovo Force (KFOR).71 Once the immediate security
situation had been resolved, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK) was established to develop the political and institutional
capacity of a future independent Kosovo state.72 While the case of Kosovo is still
controversial and in some cases, unrecognized as an independent state, it
illustrates the role that the international community plays in facilitating modern
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state independence and how the development of the institutional capacity of the
state provides the basis for a credible claim of state sovereignty.

Kosovo Force
Both the UN and NATO became involved in Kosovo in 1998 as a peacekeeping
operation to create a stable and secure environment that would bring a resolution
to the conflict between Albanians and Serbs over the status of Kosovo.73 Citing
humanitarian concerns, the UN Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the UN
Charter,74 giving the Security Council authority to act to establish an international
security presence in Kosovo.75 Article 3 of UN Security Council Resolution 1244
specifically stated that an “international security presence” would need to be
established in Kosovo to ensure the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces. The failure
of the Kosovo Verification Mission76 to diplomatically resolve the conflict led
NATO to take the initiative to use force against Serbia to ensure the right of selfdetermination for the Kosovar Albanians was upheld while also providing a path
to ending the war and discerning the final status of Kosovo.77
The Kosovo Force (KFOR) was a NATO-led institution that served as the
armed forces tasked with managing the security aspect of the conflict in Kosovo.
KFOR found its authority in UN Security Council Resolution 1244, where KFOR
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was designated as the primary international security presence in Kosovo.78
KFOR’s initial objective was to deter any renewed hostilities between Serbs and
Albanians, demilitarize the KLA, and establish a secure environment for civilians
affected by the conflict.79 An international security presence was necessary reign
in armed political violence from the KLA and to give Kosovo the capacity to
secure itself from outside threats.80
While KFOR did not necessarily demilitarize the KLA, it did absorb
militant fighters into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the primary policing
agency of Kosovo.81 This became apparent when the KLA and Kosovo political
leadership signed an “undertaking of demilitarization and transformation of the
KLA” with the command of KFOR in June 1999.82 The KPC has since evolved
into the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), a professional and lightly armed force
committed to law enforcement and emergency management, with an outlook of
the KSF eventually taking on the role of providing Kosovo’s national defense.83
Although KFOR is still deployed in Kosovo as a NATO force, it has taken a
position of minimal presence and assisting international actors in carrying out
their missions as the security situation on the ground has increased.84
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The evolution of KFOR’s role in Kosovo following the ceasefire between
Belgrade and Pristina, all through Pristina’s declaration of independence in 2008
illustrates the role the international community can play in managing the security
of a territory seeking statehood. While there is an argument that NATO has not
done enough to fully withdraw all of its troops allocated to KFOR, NATO has
been successful in facilitating the construction of an organic security apparatus in
Kosovo, as demonstrated by the development of the KPC and KSF. In the case of
Palestine, KFOR’s role in integrating militant political forces into a professional
police unit has significant potential in addressing some of the security concerns
posed by Israel when it comes to Palestinian statehood. Although it would be
difficult to advocate for a NATO-style intervention in Palestine at this time, it
would be advantageous to take a more detailed look at NATO’s role in
developing Kosovo’s security structure and how that can be applied to presentday Palestine.

UNMIK
Prior to the situation in Kosovo, the UN had not directly intervened in the
sovereignty of another state. Kosovo was the first time in which the UN
Secretariat became the executive authority85 over a state in a post-conflict zone,
and took on the duties of the state as mandated by UN Security Council
Resolution 1244. 86 Resolution 1244 effectively authorized the UN Secretariat to
initiate a plan for the international administration of the conflict in Kosovo, with
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the objective of creating self-rule in Kosovo through interim international
governance.87
The initial governing body established by Resolution 1244 was the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The structure of
UNMIK was divided into four pillars, with the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General to the UN (SRSG) overseeing the entire pillar system.
UNMIK, under the SRSG, thus became the sole governing authority in Kosovo.88
The first pillar of UNMIK addressed humanitarian issues with the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees charged with developing the humanitarian aid
program. The second pillar addressed civil administration and was run directly by
the UN. The third pillar was managed by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe’s Mission in Kosovo, addressing democratization and
institution building in Kosovo. The final pillar was managed by the European
Union and was tasked with developing a program for economic reconstruction
and development.89 Under this four pillar structure, UNMIK was to develop
provisional institutions that would eventually form the basis for a transfer of
administrative authority to local leaders once a political settlement had been
reached.90
One of the biggest challenges for this new method of creating a selfgoverning state out of a conflict zone was being able to generate internal
credibility and legitimacy for UNMIK from Kosovars. When Resolution 1244
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went into effect, a major issue for UNMIK was the existence of parallel governing
structures. In the early 1990s, the Republic of Kosova, housed in Pristina,
claimed sovereignty in Kosovo independent of existing Kosovo’s semiautonomous status.91 Initially, the Republic of Kosova had more domestic
credibility than UNMIK because the Republic of Kosova boasted a political and
economic base amongst the Kosovo population that UNMIK did not. The only
legitimacy that UNMIK could claim was the authority decreed in Resolution
1244.92 From the onset UNMIK risked falling into a trap of becoming an
internationally recognized neocolonial government within Kosovo.
The disestablishment of the Republic of Kosova in 200093 and the
recognition of UNMIK as the legitimate civilian authority apparatus in Kosovo is
applicable to the case of Palestine, particularly in regards to the challenge Hamas
poses to the Palestinian Authority. A parallel government in the Gaza Strip has
challenged the Palestinian Authority since Hamas took unilateral control over the
territory in 2007.94 As a result, the Palestinian Authority has had difficulty
obtaining internal legitimacy and external credibility, given Hamas’s mal
intentions towards the State of Israel. The Hamas-Palestinian Authority issue is
one of the main barriers to recognition of the Palestinian Authority as the
legitimate government of Palestine by the international community, particularly
Israel and the United States. UNMIK as a provisional administrative apparatus

91

Brand, 11.
Ibid.
93
The Republic of Kosova was officially disbanded on February 1, 2000, following the passage of
the Joint Interim Administrative Structure Agreement by all Kosovar leaders in December 1999
(Brand 13-15).
92

41

demonstrates the potential role the UN can play in mediating differences between
competing governments in conflict zones.

Joint Interim Administrative Structure
To address the deficiency of internal legitimacy created by UN-led governance,
UNMIK developed the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) in 2000, the
purpose of which was to disband parallel institutions and to include local
administrative leadership in the UNMIK system.95 The JIAS Agreement
recognized the need for consolidating authority under the UNMIK system while
simultaneously establishing joint administrative control between UNMIK and
domestic Kosovar leadership.
A key issue that JIAS resolved was the existence of parallel institutions
particularly from the Republic of Kosova. Because the Republic of Kosvoa
claimed partial sovereignty over Kosovo, it had been a major challenge towards
any one, central government from claiming full authority over the territory since
the inception of UNMIK.96 The new JIAS system became a mechanism for
absorbing competing governing bodies while simultaneously institutionalizing the
governing structures established by JIAS as legitimate components of Kosovar
self-rule.97
In order for JIAS to be accepted by competing factions, the Interim
Administrative Council (IAC) was created to include competing governing
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structures in a comprehensive institution under UNMIK.98 IAC became the most
important political body because it exercised de facto legislative powers that other
JIAS components were unable to.99 It was the primary mechanism within the
JIAS agreement that political power was devolved too. Another major institution
expanded upon under the JIAS agreement was the Kosovo Transitional Council
(KTC). The KTC was developed to provide a platform for the various
stakeholders in Kosovo to be represented in.100 The primary purpose of the KTC
was to be consultative rather than legislative, with the main focus of promoting
and representing the interests of the different stakeholders rather than creating
solutions.101
The JIAS Agreement also developed the administrative ministries that
were necessary to compromise a functioning bureaucracy. The administrative
departments consisted of reforming already existent governing ministries as well
as creating entirely new ones. The purpose for developing the administrative
duties was to institutionalize a well-functioning civilian bureaucracy that would
operate on technical capability and functionality during the interim period as well
an independent Kosovar state was proclaimed.102 While JIAS established the
framework and the institutions for an interim government, the second phase of
transitioning UNMIK into the State of Kosovo necessitated the completion of
elections.
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Framework for Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
In October 2000, municipal elections were held under the JIAS framework,
bringing newly elected municipal governments into power, devolving
administrative power from UNMIK to local authorities.103 With the transfer of
power to municipal governments, the Provisional Institutions for SelfGovernment (PISG) was established in 2001 under the Constitutional Framework
for Provisional Government. The objective of PISG was to transfer interim
authority to local institutions, with the intent of using this framework to transfer
authority to institutions on a national level.104 The Constitutional Framework was
significant in the state-building process in Kosovo because it established the rules
of the game for Kosovar institutions and determined how those institutions would
function after the 2001 elections.105
The Constitutional Framework focused on establishing the primary
institutions of governance. The four main institutions that encompassed PISG
were the Assembly, President of Kosovo, Government, and Courts.106 The
Assembly of Kosovo is the most important PISG institution under the
Constitutional Framework because created a legislative apparatus that would
represent the Kosovar public in the larger context of the SRSG and UNMIK.107
An important power given to the Assembly was the election of the President of
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Kosovo using a secret ballot.108 This was significant because it devolved power
to an elected body, creating a mechanism for allocating administrative authority
between Kosovars and UNMIK. Despite this, the President’s executive powers
were limited to coordinating external relations with the SRSG and consulting with
political parties to identify a candidate for Prime Minister in the Assembly.109
The Government of Kosovo consisted of the prime minister and the ministers of
the administrative departments. The Government itself was restricted by the
amount of autonomy it had on a national level because UNMIK reserved powers
for its own discretion, limiting the scope of the Government of Kosovo’s powers
within the PISG framework.110 Chapters 8 and 12 of the Constitutional
Framework reserved specific administrative powers to the SRSG, with the SRSG
also having supreme authority over the PISG.111
Although creating these institutions was important for creating a
momentum towards self-rule, the main limitation on the new PISG framework
was that it did not completely devolve authority to national institutions. Under
the SRSG, UNMIK still retained its power as the sole authority in Kosovo,
resulting in little to no change in the political situation on the ground in
Kosovo.112 Authority was not completely devolved to institutions because power
was transferred on the basis of operational and functional credibility rather than
political legitimacy.113
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Within the PISG framework, the special representative of the secretary
general, Michael Steiner, established a policy of “standards before status,”
designating specific benchmarks that Kosovo would have to meet for the UN to
determine the final status of Kosovo. The eight benchmarks focused primarily on
economic and political goals and consisted of: functioning democratic institutions,
rule of law, freedom of movement, returns and reintegration, economy, property
rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the function of the Kosovo Protection
Corps.114 Establishing benchmarks to transition from occupation to independence
is important because they establish a task list that otherwise represents a timeline
towards independence, mapping out a clearly defined end game. These
benchmarks hold the UN accountable in determining Kosovo’s final status while
also giving the Kosovar public a metric to assess their progression towards
statehood. By retaining supreme executive authority over national institutions,
however, UNMIK under the SRSG jeopardized the viability of an independent
Kosovar state that had the sovereignty to manage its own affairs. The
continuation of a status quo where Kosovo institutions were subordinated to
international rule necessitated a reassessment of Kosovo’s final status as an
independent state.

The Ahtisaari Plan and Kosovar Independence
In 2007, Finnish diplomat Martti Ahtisaari was appointed UN Special Envoy to
Kosovo and in February of the same year he published the Comprehensive
Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Since UN Security Council
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Resolution 1244 laid the foundation for a state-building program in Kosovo in
1999, the “Ahtisaari Plan,” as the proposal was referred to, evaluated the work
done by the international community up to that point and implicitly advocated for
Kosovo’s independence while also establishing a transitory timetable under which
such independence should arise.115 In order to develop the capacity of Kosovar
institutions to a point where independence could successfuly be declared,
however, the Ahtisaari Plan created two new institutions116—the International
Civilian Representative (ICR) and the International Steering Group for Kosovo
(ISG).
The ICR was created to implement the recommendations spelled out in the
Ahtisaari Plan. According to Article 11.4, “the ICR shall have overall
responsibility for the supervision, and shall be the final authority in Kosovo
regarding interpretation of this Settlement.”117 In order to interpret and
successfully implement the letter and spirit of the plan, the ICR was given
exclusive authority independent of existing authoritative bodies. Furthermore, the
ICR would remain the sole executor of the Ahtisaari Plan until the ISG could
determin that the terms of the settlement had been satisfactorily implemented.118
The ICR was important because it minimized UNMIK’s role as the sole guarantor
of executive authority in Kosovo. At the same time, it created a pathway for
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sufficiently transferring international authority to Kosovar institutions where
previous agreements had fallen short.
The other main institution to emerge out of the Ahtisaari Plan, the ISG119
was responsible for appointing the ICR and was responsible for obtaining
endorsement from the Security Council.120 The main authority of the ISG,
derived from Annex IX, Art. 5 of the Ahtisaari Plan, states “the mandate of the
ICR shall be terminated when the International Steering Group determines that
Kosovo has implemented the terms of this Settlement.”121 Both the ICR and the
ISG were responsible for implementing and executing Ahtisaari’s proposal, while
also acting as indicators that would determine when the Kosovo was ready to be
weaned off of international support and become an independent state.
One of the most important components of the Ahtisaari Plan was the
timetable for a transition of power from international authority to self-governance
in Kosovo. According to Article 14, UNMIK and the Constitutional Framework
for Provisional Self-Government would “remain in effect until the end of the [120
day] transition period.”122 Under Article 14.1, the plan explicitly states that “at
the end of the transition period UNMIK’s mandate shall expire and all legislative
and executive authority vested in UNMIK shall be transferred en bloc to the
governing authorities of Kosovo.”123 This clause resolves prior issues of
adequately devolving administrative authority by clearly stating how power will
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be decentralized, to whom it will be given, and the period of time it will take to
fully devolved power to the Kosovar state. While not explicitly declaring
independence on behalf of the Kosovars, the Ahtisaari Plan, recognized the
necessity of an eventual cessation of internationally exercised authority in
Kosovo.
In March 2007, UN Secretary-General, ban Ki-moon, stated his support
for the Plan.124 In the report, the Secretary-General cited that continued
international administration of Kosovo was not sustainable because it continued
an environment of political uncertainty that prevented the economy in particular
from being able to develop to it’s fullest capacity.125 Because the international
administration of Kosovo had denied Serbia any claim of sovereignty over
Kosovo since 1999, the Secretary-General also made the argument that an
independent Kosovo was the only viable option left to pursue.126 Due to political
division127 within the UN Security Council, the Ahtisaari Plan was not fully
implemented. As a result, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from
Serbia on February 17, 2008.128
The Ahtisaari Plan is important to understand the progression of Kosovo’s
independence, particularly as it relates to the present issue of Palestinian
statehood. Utilizing previous agreements, the Ahtisaari Plan established
benchmarks to assess whether or not Kosovo was ready to become an independent
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state, created new institutions that would take over the authoritative capabilities
that UNMIK and the SRSG had otherwise reserved from themselves, and defined
a timeframe in which the objectives of the Ahtisaari Plan were to be fulfilled. The
Palestinians have been signatories to international agreements much like the
Ahtisaari Plan, which provide a guide for how to obtain an independent
Palestinian state, the most notable of which was the 2003 Roadmap for Peace.
Without seeing any progress from meeting internationally agreed benchmarks, the
Palestinians took their case to the UN in 2011 in a similar manner that the
Assembly of Kosovo declared its own independence in 2008. Both the
governments of Kosovo and the Palestinian Authority demonstrate that in the
absence of recognized independence, emerging states may look outside the scope
of provisional frameworks to meet their ultimate objectives.

The Kosovo Precedent?
As of 2013, 99 of a potential 193 UN Member States, including the United States,
have recognized Kosovo’s independence.129 The support and recognition of
Kosovo by the international community begs the question: can a state become a
state simply by declaring itself as one? Some would argue that the case of
Kosovo is “unique” and cannot be considered a model for other independence
movements because it is routed in a conflict that arose from the breakup of
Yugoslavia, while the ethnic cleansing of Albanians by Serb forces in that conflict
also expedited the necessity for an independent state in Kosovo on the grounds of
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humanitarian action.130 In this regard, it is argued that Kosovo would not provide
a satisfactory model for other independence movements because of the
immediacy of conflict or threat to one’s livelihood is absent that was unique to
Kosovars. While Israel’s occupation of the West Bank does not pose an
immediate danger to the Palestinian people, it does create perpetual hardships that
in the long run, undermining the longevity of the Palestinian population. This
study would thus argue that while the case of Kosovo was unique in a certain
regard that does not make it inapplicable to other independence movements, such
as the case of Palestine.
Despite the immediacy of resolving the security issue, Kosovo’s story of
independence is a satisfactory example for other movements to follow because of
the equally unique role the international community played in developing the
institutions that would eventually compromise a future, independent Kosovar
state. The declaration of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 set a precedent by
allowing the UN Secretary-General to assume the administrative authority of the
state, for the first time, in the UN’s history. As a result, the UN ascertained a new
authority that could allow the UN Secretariat to act as the guardian of an
autonomous region while institutions were being constructed, with the intent of
that government executing its own sovereignty once it was determined that that
government had the capacity to do so. This has important implications for
Palestine as a form of UN guardianship could weaken the control of the
occupation regime while also assessing the ability of Palestinian institutions to
function as a sovereign state. The case of Kosovo illustrates the potential the
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international community has in enabling occupied regions to exert sovereignty,
particularly through UN-managed guardianship over internal state-building
processes.
In both the cases of Israel and Kosovo, statehood did not come
instantaneously, but rather, it resulted from a process of institution building that
spanned decades. Israel relied on an ideological foundation for building
momentum within the Jewish population, a strong international Diaspora, and
leniency from the British Mandatory government in Mandatory Palestine to foster
the institution building process. These factors culminated into the declaration of
Israel’s independence in 1948. Ethnic conflict that resulted from the collapse of
Yugoslavia and the dissolution of states in the Balkans region, necessitated
intervention from the international community in Kosovo to protect the Albanian
population from a humanitarian disaster. Kosovo was thus born out of a decade
of guided independence whereby the United Nations and NATO, along with other
international organizations in Europe, built institutions in Kosovo with the intent
of transferring the authority of those institutions to the Kosovo people. In 2008,
the Kosovars declared their independence from Serbia and their readiness to take
over those institutions necessary for operating a sovereign state. These two case
studies are important in analyzing the current status of Palestine because they
show the role institution building played in enabling future independence, as well
as the role the international community played, particularly the UN, in
recognizing state sovereignty.
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PART III: State of Palestine

State in the Making: The Institutional Development of the Palestinian
Authority

The Palestinian Authority is the recognized governing body of the Palestinians in
West Bank and Gaza131 and was established during the Oslo peace conference in
1993. Today the Palestinian Authority exercises full autonomy over Area A and
civilian autonomy of Area B, compromising only 30 percent of the territory in the
West Bank.132

Figure 1 Map illustrating Palestinian territorial control in the West Bank
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From 1993 the end of the second intifada to the present day, the new Palestinian
leadership has been working to establish the Palestinian Authority as a legitimate
government in the West Bank with well functioning institutions that resemble the
functional capacity of other recognized states. This is to demonstrate that the
Palestinian Authority has the capacity to forma a recognized state in the West
Bank, particularly from the views of the international community. This section
will look at how the Palestinian Authority has evolved since its inception in 1993
by looking at institution building during the Oslo years and after the second
intifada.133 It will show that, while Palestinian institutions are imperfect, the
present institutional framework of the Palestinian Authority has the capacity to
govern a sovereign state in the West Bank and the potential to continue building
institutions.

Oslo and the Birth of the Palestinian Authority
Yitzhak Rabin, then Prime Minister of Israel and Yasser Arafat, chairman of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) met at the White House in September
1993 to sign the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government,
commonly known as the Oslo Peace Accords. This agreement provided for the
establishment of the Palestinian Authority, to begin administering Palestinian
governance in 1994, and committed to transferring authority to the Palestinians
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after an interim period of five years.134 The Palestinian Authority was
conceptualized to be an administrative, governing body, distinct from the
Palestinian Liberation Organization while also part of the negotiation process. In
this manner, the Palestinian Authority was to be a platform for managing and
negotiating the future Palestinian state, not the start of a long term institution
building program.135 Per the agreement, civilian and security authority would
eventually be transferred from the Israeli government to the Palestinian Authority
once an elected legislative parliament began its term.136 Through the “peace
process,” the Palestinian Authority formed the basis of a new Palestinian
government that could operate in Palestinian territory, in addition to a bilateral
customs union, and the Palestinian Legislative Council, which constituted the
building blocks of the Palestinian state in the making during the interim period.
In addition to the establishment of an administrative body, the Oslo period
also created a framework for Israeli and Palestinian economic interactions.
Meeting in Paris in 1994, Israeli and PLO representatives signed the Gaza-Jericho
Agreement, otherwise known as the Paris Protocol. The agreement created a
customs union between Israel and the Palestinian territories, which made Israel a
steward137 of Palestinian economic development with the intent to open Palestine
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to Israeli markets, enabling economic development.138 The preamble of the
official agreement states “this protocol lays the groundwork for strengthening the
economic base of the Palestinian side and for exercising its right of economic
decision making in accordance with its own development plan and priorities.”139
Although not an institution in and of itself, the Paris Protocol is the operational
paradigm for economic development in Palestine.
Using the Paris Protocol as the basis for growth, the PLO created a vehicle
for implementing economic development. The Palestinian Economic Council for
Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) was created in 1993, independent of
the Palestinian Authority, to facilitate economic policy institutionalize economic
development in the Palestinian Territories.140 PECDAR is an important
institution from the Oslo period because it formulated the Palestinian Authority’s
economic policy, while also implementing its policy into development projects.141
More importantly, it was a tool for international donors to use to support
development projects while not becoming embroiled in domestic nepotism and
corruption.142 Development projects facilitated through PECDAR in the
Palestinian Authority’s infant years included infrastructure development, job
creation and private sector investment, and fostering the growth of Palestinian
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ministries, agencies, and municipal governments.143 PECDAR continues to play
an important role in development construction in the West Bank and Gaza.
In addition to facilitating the economic development of the Palestinian
Territories, the Oslo Process also provided for the creation of a Palestinian
parliament that would operate alongside the newly created Palestinian Authority.
In 1996, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) met for the first time after
national elections.144 The primary purpose of the PLC was to provide executive
oversight to the PLO and Palestinian Authority, with Yasser Arafat as the dualhatted leader of the Palestinian Territories.145 To engage in oversight, the PLC
scrutinized the administration of the Palestinian Authority and promoted
accountability of government operations, approved the budget, and issued
resolutions to establish a policy agenda.146 The main challenge for the PLC
during the Oslo years was to legislate while also accommodating Arafat’s vision
for the future Palestinian state. Arafat found the source of his power in ruling by
decree, and his legitimacy of rule in charismatic leadership of executive office.
As a result, the PLC was an impotent body unable to legislate, wrest power away
from the executive branch, or facilitate political activity in the Palestinian
Territories.147 Although wholly unintended as long-term solutions, the Palestinian
Authority, PLC, and other agencies and agreements devolved from the Oslo
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Process into the building framework for the eventual establishment of the State of
Palestine.

Palestinian Reform and Development Plan, 2008-2010
With the establishment of a new cabinet and government under Salam Fayyad in
the immediate aftermath of the second intifada, 2007 proved to be a pivotal year
for the Palestinian Authority. In advance of the December 2007 Paris donors
conference, the Palestinian Authority prepared a medium-term program known as
the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP), establishing how the
Palestinians would wrangle in the foundering Palestinian economy and develop
the foundations for the institutions that would support a well-functioning state.
The PRDP is guided by the Palestinian National Policy Agenda (PNPA), a
set of goals and objectives that the Palestinian Authority established representing
a framework for how the Palestinian Authority would prioritize PRDP
initiatives.148 There are four primary principles of the PNPA: self-determination
of the Palestinian people; independence in a sovereign state; territorial integrity
based on securing the borders from 1967; and the promoting values of
democracy.149 These principles reflect the Montevideo criteria, as well as the
objectives pursued by both Israel and Kosovo when they sought their own
independence, respectively. According to the PNPA framework, the only way
that the Palestinian people can realize these goals in the long term is through full
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independence by ending Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories.150 The
strategy of the Palestinian leadership at this time was to use the PRDP as a source
of credibility and legitimacy in the international community with the hope that
donor states and other international supporters would put enough pressure on
Israel to withdraw the occupation.
In order to end the occupation and achieve these long term principles, the
PNPA laid out four primary objectives: safety and security; good governance;
increased national prosperity; and enhanced quality of life.151 These four
objectives have restructured how resources are allocated in order to achieve these
immediate goals. The purpose of the PRDP is to implement the goals and
objectives of the PNPA by appropriately allocating financial and personnel
resources towards government ministries that best represent these goals and that
will best undermine the continuation of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian
territory.
The PRDP itself is a strategy for implementing the goals laid out in the
PNPA. Its primary focus is allocating Palestinian Authority expenditures to
government ministries that will be the most successful at achieving the Palestinian
Authority’s short-term objectives and long-term goals. By adopting this policy,
the Palestinian Authority effectively used the PRDP to determine which
institutions would be most useful in achieving the Palestinian Authority’s longterm goals—ending the occupation and establishing an independent state.
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The heart of the PRDP is the policies and programs the Palestinian
Authority intended to implement from 2008-2010, and these policies and
programs are divided into four sectors: governance; social; economy; and
infrastructure. The first sector, governance, cites the Office of the President, the
Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministries of Finance and Planning, and the General
Personnel Council as the main state-level bodies that would be responsible for
carrying out reforms and policy plans. The primary responsibility of these bodies
is to be the decision-makers and to manage public fiscal and human resources.152
To empower these bodies with greater authority, the PRDP proposed security
sector reform (including strengthening the rule of law), fiscal reform, and
administrative reform. These reforms would be accomplished by restructuring the
security sector, addressing two major sources of Palestinian Authority
expenditures—public sector salaries and subsidized public energy consumption—
and promoting accountability and oversight that would enhance the Office of the
Prime Minister, the Palestinian Legislative Council, and the Financial
Administration Control Bureau to monitor, audit, and report on Palestinian
Authority policies and implementation.153 The main purpose of these reforms was
to enhance the capacity of public sector offices to execute policies in accords to
the four objectives laid out by the PNPA.154
The Palestinian Authority also recognized the need to improve its own
ability to provide social services to the Palestinian people. Reforms and
development in the social sector look to enhance the role of the ministries of
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Education, Health, and Social Affairs in providing Palestinian services.155 As
argued by Marx, one of the ways a state apparatus distinguishes itself within a
society and apart from other states is through monopolization on the distribution
of resources and services.156 The PRDP indicates that providing quality health
and education services are one of the ways the Palestinian Authority believes it
can provide social coherence and economic growth.157 Health and education are
two indicators of continuity of administrative policy that, if they show
improvement over time, will indicate a maturation of a state’s administrative
bureaucracy and the quality of life within the population.
One of the ways that the Palestinian Authority sees itself being able to
improve the economic well being of the West Bank is through private sector-led
growth. The ministries of Finance and Planning, as well as the Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics and the Palestinian Monetary Authority are the public
sector and specialized agencies that are targeted to lead private sector growth in
the Palestinian Authority.158 The major barriers facing private-led growth is the
continued physical occupation of the West Bank, Israel’s role as the guardian of
the Palestinian economy, as indicated in the Paris Protocol, and a lack of
substantial reforms in the civil service and inflation of the public sector within the
Palestinian Authority.159 Because the Palestinians themselves do not have control
over their own economy, there is a glass ceiling on the amount of progress they
can make in empowering state-level economic institutions to develop and execute
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monetary and fiscal policies, as well as easing the pressure on the pocketbooks of
average Palestinians. The major factor influencing the Palestinian Authority’s
desire to reform the economic sector in the short-term is to “[restore] trust in the
Palestinian Authority’s economic management capability.”160 All states struggle
with economic management, however, as indicated in this section of the PDRP,
the Palestinian Authority wants to improve its own capacity and capability to
manage the Palestinian economy so that success within Palestinian Authority
institution building would confront the continuation of Israeli hegemony over
Palestinian economic affairs, inciting a renegotiation of economic relations.
The final sector that the PRDP targets for reform and development is
infrastructure. As noted in the PRDP “sound infrastructure is a fundamental
requirement for sustainable development.”161 Developing local and state-level
infrastructure needs would enable the PA to modernize the state to improve the
governing capacity of administrative institutions and also promote modernization
that would lead to eventual private investment for economic growth.162 The
PRDP notes that a dependency on Israeli electric and water companies limits the
Palestinian Authority’s ability to exploit its natural resources.163 As a result, the
occupation is extended beyond the military realm into the government and
economic periphery of Palestinian authority. The improvement of infrastructure
is important to the success of the Palestinian Authority due to the cross-cutting
impact infrastructure has on the aforementioned sectors for institutional reform. It
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would strengthen the capacity of public ministries to work interdependently while
also promoting private investment for the physical growth of the West bank.
The PRDP laid the groundwork for a post-intifada State of Palestine by
detailing the framework of Palestinian goals for self-determination, and a
roadmap for how the Palestinian Authority envisioned itself executing those
goals. Although the plan itself is vague on how specific implementation of
reform programs would be enforced, it detailed the public institutions that would
be tasked with executing sector-specific programs while also providing short-term
objectives that would act as benchmarks for measuring success. The continuation
of the status quo164 was the primary barrier to successful implementation of the
PRDP, despite that, however, it began the on-the-ground, de facto state-building
program for the Palestinian Authority.

Program of the Thirteenth Government—Ending the Occupation, Establishing the
State
In 2009, Prime Minister Salam Fayyad commissioned the Program of the
Thirteenth Government to identify the roles of public sector agencies identified in
the PRDP165 within the narrow objective of ending the occupation and
establishing a sovereign State of Palestine. The primary difference between the
PRDP and the new Program of the Thirteenth government was the emphasis on
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“establish[ing] a de facto state apparatus within the next two years.”166 Rather
than producing a plan for reform and development programs that would help
achieve short-term goals, the Program of the Thirteenth Government aimed at
achieving statehood by changing facts on the ground.167 This strategy was more
aggressive at attaining de facto statehood and was inspired by two arguments—on
the one hand, juxtaposing de facto Palestinian statehood with an Israeli
occupation would increasing become a tough sell for the international
community.168 Likewise, Fayyad also argued that Israeli statehood itself had not
just happened in 1948, but rather, institutions had been developed well before the
State of Israel had even been declared.169 With the Program of the Thirteenth
Government, Fayyad sought to deconstruct the structure of the occupation regime
that would otherwise continue to be the status quo ad infinitum.
The foundational basis for the Program of the Thirteenth Government
within the Palestinian narrative is the 1988 Declaration of Independence170 and
the 2003 Basic Law,171 both of which supported the development of a democratic
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and pluralistic system of government in the State of Palestine.172 Rather than
emphasizing abstract ideals pertaining to freedom and independence, the plan
cites existing documents that support the notion of a future state based on
universally accepted principles of democracy and the rule of law. By doing so,
however, the Program of the Thirteenth Government inherently politicized the
nature of Palestinian state-building by calling for new elections and urging the
Palestinian polity to unify around the shared goal of independent statehood.
The Program overpromises and under delivers in institutionalizing
electoral processes and structurally reforming the economy. In Fayyad’s personal
foreword to the document, he cites that collective dedication and unity with help
the Palestinian people achieve their shared aspiration of establishing an
independent state.173 The main problem with this assumption is that while
Palestinians ubiquitously want an independent state, the way of obtaining said
state differs between Palestinians.174 For Fayyad, as indicated by the Program of
the Thirteenth Government, the Palestinians need a de facto state to challenge the
Israeli occupation. Fayyad himself, however, is an unelected presidential
appointee who lacks domestic political clout. With Fatah otherwise dominating
the political environment in the West Bank, it would be difficult to hold the
elections promised in the Program without Fayyad losing his job and Fatah losing
ground to Hamas.
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The other shortcoming of the Program of the Thirteenth Government is
that it is limited in the amount of structural economic reforms that can be made
under a foreign economic regime. Despite the fact that the Program develops a
bureaucratic and administrative governing apparatus for the Palestinian Authority,
it does not offer a solution to the longstanding conflict with Israel. As a result, the
Palestinian Authority still does not have the ability to exploit land in Area C for
industrial and private sector growth, while Israeli settlement construction on the
same section of land simultaneously increases.175 The Program recognizes the
need for private sector-led growth however, the Palestinian Authority continues to
operate as a quasi-rentier state, funded by external donations and customs duties
transferred by the State of Israel.176 The absence of clear-cut structural economic
reforms that would diminish the role of external donations in the internal revenue
structure of the Palestinian Authority perpetuates an unsustainable economic
model.
Despite these shortcomings, however, the Program of the Thirteenth
Government has seen great success in building a security apparatus that is able to
coordinate with Israeli security forces, as well as building a technocratic
bureaucracy where ministries function on the authority of their office rather than
individual charisma. Security reform is one of the core components of
successfully achieving an independent Palestinian state as insecurity during the
second intifada was the main cause of an increased Israeli military presence in the
West Bank, which included internal security checkpoints that severely restricted

175
176

Broning, 116-117.
Broning, 115.

66

freedom of movement and limited the ability of the Palestinian Authority to
govern.177 The intifada was a period where the rule of law broke down and the
Palestinian Authority did not have a firm grasp on groups posing a security
liability to Israel, resulting in tighter Israeli controls. By managing security risks
and promoting the professionalization of Palestinian security forces, the Program
of the Thirteenth Government has restored a sense of security to the West
Bank.178
The professionalization of the Palestinian security forces has been a joint
effort between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and American military personnel.
In 2005, the United States authorized the Office of the United States Security
Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC), with the mission of
building a security apparatus under the Palestinian Authority that would be
accountable to civilian leadership while maintaining security for the Palestinian
Authority and the State of Israel.179 U.S. training of Israeli and Palestinian
security forces has been widely lauded by the international community, where the
security situation on the ground has outpaced the diplomatic processes in finding
a resolution to the conflict.180 This is because a neutral process for security
reform, created by the USSC, developed before and independent of economic and
government reforms.181 Thus, when the Palestinian Authority began to enact
reforms under the PRDP and the Program of the Thirteenth Government, the
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security forces were already institutionalized as professional force, with mutually
recognized improvement of the security situation on the ground between both
governments of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
The Program of the Thirteenth Government has also led to the
development of a technocratic administrative bureaucracy with authority resting
in ministerial offices rather than the ministers themselves. During the Oslo
period, government ministries were operated by General Directorates, who were
beneficiaries of a lucrative patronage system, sponsored by the Office of the
President.182 As a result, governance within the Palestinian Authority rested on a
network of friendships with authority subsisting in individuals rather than
institutions. Administrative staff also operated under a similar system where
ministry personnel were associated as that ministry rather than part of it.183
Reforms initiated under the PRDP and continued under the Program of the
Thirteenth Government professionalized the administrative bureaucracy so that
ministries were made functional, more efficient, and accountable to the Prime
Minister’s government.
The PRDP and the Program of the Thirteenth Government both represent
a structural development of the institutional capacity of the administrative and
bureaucratic aspects of a Palestinian state. Although the political aspect of the
Program of the Thirteenth Government is imperfect at best, the Palestinian
government of the Office of the Prime Minister and the ministries under his
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charge has grown in the post-intifada years to function and operate in state-like
manner.

National Development Plan, 2011-2013
While the PRDP initiated the process of institution-building in 2007 and the
Program of the Thirteenth Government determined the powers and authorities
delegated to government ministries, the National Development (NDP) assesses
the Palestinian Authority’s success at building a State of Palestine by defining
specific benchmarks of success. The national policy agenda defines three
ultimate objectives—independence, sovereignty, and open borders—to be
established through reform and development programs in the sectors of
governance, social, economy, and infrastructure.184 The 2011-2013 NDP builds
upon previous government programs by subdividing the implementation of
reforms into 23 sectoral strategies, with the prioritization of development
expenditures.185
For each of the four national sectors, the NDP records a baseline marker
and a target for improvement in the course of two years. The PRDP initiated the
process of institution building and detailed reform and development programs in
each sector, however, it did not establish empirical figures for gauging the success
or failure of PRDP programs. The NDP provides a 2013 target for the strategic
objectives of each national sector. Some of the most important measures of
strategic sectoral initiatives include: decreasing the wage bill of public sector
184
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employees, decreasing recurrent public expenditures in favor of increased
development spending, economic growth, and a decrease in electricity subsidies
provided to municipalities. The targets for these objectives are based upon a
national fiscal policy that was generated from evaluations of PRDP reforms from
2008-2010, and incorporated into the strategies outline by the Palestinian
Authority’s national policy agenda.
The NDP is particularly beneficial to understanding the progression of
institution building within the Palestinian Authority because it analyzes recorded
data from 2008-2010 and also addresses alternative scenarios, particularly the
continuation of the status quo, when assessing projected success of reform
programs by 2013. The core finding of the PRDP was that despite an increase in
constraints imposed on the Palestinian Authority by the occupation, the
Palestinian Authority experienced economic growth that exceeded
expectations.186 From 2006-2010, net revenues increased while the recurrent
budget deficit decreased along with unemployment.187 Because the occupation
regime had not abated, as was assumed in the PRDP, the 2011-2013 NDP
incorporates the continuation of the status quo in determining the projections for
2013.188 The NDP reveals that economic growth and budgetary revenues would
contract if the status quo were maintained, and that “recurrent spending would
continue to crowd out public investment.”189 The latter finding is telling as it
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shows the insolvency of the Palestinian economy under the status quo. Whereas
the objective for 2013 is to have a greater expenditure output for development
than for the recurrent budget,190 this would not be possible under the current state
of affairs.
Although the NDP marks a clear strategic outlook for the Palestinian
Authority, there continues to be major shortcomings towards establishing an
independent, sovereign State of Palestine. The PRDP, Program of the Thirteenth
Government, and the 2011-2013 NDP do not have political processes for
implementing the reforms they each call for. In an introductory statement of the
NDP, Prime Minister Salam Fayyad states “effective institutions alone are not
enough; we must also answer our people’s call for political unity.”191 While it
goes without saying that a political process is needed to facilitate the “roll-back of
the forces and infrastructure of the occupation,”192 a process for reconciliation
between Hamas and Fatah, as well as disparate groups is also needed. The need
for a political process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, as well as the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip was increasingly apparent in the NDP as certain
programs, such as rebuilding airport in Gaza or establishing Palestinian sea ports
on the Mediterranean coast, will not be possible under the current political
climate. (Although these are important factors to take note of, they contribute
more to a political discussion rather than to a discussion on the actual
development of Palestinian institutions).
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In conjunction to the absence of institutionalize political processes, the
NDP does not gauge the likelihood of success for the national development
expenditure plan of sectoral reforms. While the NDP prioritizes the most
important reform programs in accords to the policy agenda of the Palestinian
Authority, it does not prioritize the feasibility of reform programs across national
sectors. Under the development expenditure plan for the infrastructure sector, the
Palestinian Authority aims to increase funding towards “international gateways”
by 13% from 2011 to 2013.193 By increasing Palestinian access to international
gateways, Palestinian Authority leaders argue that this would open Palestinian
markets to the international community and enable the development of a
knowledge-based economy through the transfer of technology and innovation
between trading partners and Palestine.194 The Palestinian Authority seeks to
establish these international gateways through airports in Jerusalem and Gaza and
the construction of ports along the Gaza coast.195 As previously mentioned, the
current political environment within the Palestinian polity and between Israel and
the Palestinian governments in the West Bank and Gaza would make a project
like this impossible. Prioritization of projects based on feasibility would enable
the Palestinian Authority to more prudently allocate scarce financial resources
between its four national sectors.
The NDP is a continuation of the state building process that shows
maturation of the Palestinian government in the West Bank and the development
of government institutions that are able to execute reform and development
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programs. While the absence of political processes is pervasive in each of the
national plans, the NDP measures the success of institution building over time.
While the development of Palestinian institutions has not been perfect
over the last two decades, the current state of the Palestinian Authority has
reached a greater capacity to manage a Palestinian state that was not present
during its inception under the Oslo Process. While the Oslo interim framework
for eventual statehood was good in theory, it was not implemented as intended by
either party. With the introduction of a new government in 2007, the Palestinian
Authority has engaged in an aggressive attempt to build a de facto state in the
absence of genuine political negotiations. While many in the international
community were cautiously optimistic at Prime Minister Fayyad’s early attempts
at state building, the success of the Palestinian Authority in recent years has
brought the Palestinian Authority’s state-building efforts credibility on an
international scale. Through the evolution of the Palestinian state in the making
initiative, the PA is now on the verge of a remarkable breakthrough in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, while teetering on the precipice of a spectacular failure.
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PART IV: ASSESSING THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

The Oslo peace process was originally intended to provide the Palestinians a
viable route to statehood and independence through the Palestinian Authority.
While Israel did not implement the Oslo Accords as intended, the Palestinian
government was also incapable of effectively governing under a system where the
executive exerted too much power. As a result of these factors, and the eruption
of the second intifada, the Oslo process stalled, the occupation regime intensified,
and to this day there is no fully recognized and independent Palestinian state.
Within the Oslo framework, the international community has been the
primary benefactor of aid to the fledgling Palestinian community, however, it has
played an important role in assessing the success or failure of the peace process
through conferences, summits, and written reports. This section will look at
assessments made at the end of the interim period during the late 1990s, as well as
assessments made in recent years to understand the international community’s
opinion on Palestinian statehood. After the 2011 gambit for statehood in the
United Nations, it is increasingly important to understand if de facto state building
on the ground by the Palestinian Authority is translating into de facto recognition
by other states. International recognition of the Palestinian Authority as a capable
governing body of a future Palestinian state is leading to increasing isolation of
Israel and the occupation regime.
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The Rocard Report
When the Oslo Accords were signed, it was determined that the Palestinian
Authority would work under limited autonomy for a five-year interim period,
after which, Israel would transfer civil, economic, and some military authority to
the Palestinian Authority. In 1999, an independent task force, led by former
Prime Minister of France, Michel Rocard, convened to provide the first
assessment of the Palestinian Authority at the conclusion of the 5-year interim
period. For the purposes of this research, the Rocard Report identifies to what
degree Palestinian Authority institutional development had been successful in the
course of its first five years of existence, providing a good comparison for
understanding the current institutional capacity of the Palestinian Authority.
The Rocard Report identified criteria it believed was necessary for a
permanent resolution to the conflict, arguing that by enhancing the capacity of the
Palestinian Authority to exercise good governance that would lend to “the
strengthening of Palestinian public institutions.”196 The Report named seven
reforms that the PLO197 could enact, independent of political negotiations with
Israel. The first four recommendations dealt with the three branches of
government and the establishment of a constitution to discern the principles under
which the three branches of government would operate. While creating a
constitution and developing the legislative and judicial capacities of formal public
institutions is important, the task force recommended a “leaner office of the
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presidency” that had the ability and will to transfer administrative authority to
other branches of government.198 This recommendation is important because
Yasser Arafat, double-hatted as both the PLO chairman and the Palestinian
Authority president, aggregated an immense amount of power in himself.
Arafat’s own power was largely determined by decree, giving him the capability
(although not necessarily the authority) to abrogate legislation and initiatives
enacted by other institutions.199
The other three recommendations the Rocard Report gave for
strengthening public institutions dealt largely with building the capacity of the
Palestinian Authority to administer efficiently and effectively. Transparency in
managing finances and merit-based civil service selection were two
recommendations made that addressed the issue of corruption and nepotism
within the Palestinian political leadership. At this time it was not uncommon for
government ministers to utilize public resources for personal gain, or to make
preferential business arrangements with close friends and relatives.200 As a result,
public institutions governed under a system of patronage rather than good
governance. The Rocard Report identified recommendations to improve the
ability of public institutions to govern effectively because nepotism, corruption,
favoritism, and the concentration of power were factors that indicated the
Palestinian Authority was not yet ready to govern a state of its own in 1999.
These recommendations began to be enacted, in earnest, once Yasser
Arafat no longer possessed complete executive power over the Palestinian
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Authority. In 2003, the Basic Law was amended to include the Office of the
Prime Minister.201 While the legal document itself is not perfect, it lays out the
authorities of public institutions and is a source from which authority can be
derived from. By creating an Office of the Prime Minister, executive power was
divided so that the executive himself was not the sole source or executor of
authority in the Palestinian Authority. Subsequent reform programs under the
Office of the Prime Minister have lead to an improved government structure that
has the capacity to monitor progress and the will to be more transparent and
accountable to the Palestinian people and the international community than in the
past.

IMF and World Bank Reports
Since the inception of the Palestinian Authority, the World Bank and the IMF
have been instrumental international agencies that have gathered and distributed
aid to development projects throughout the Palestinian Territories. For the
purposes of this paper, the World Bank and the IMF have also been useful in
understanding the development of Palestinian institutions from an economic
perspective. In 2011 and 2012, both institutions published annual reports
analyzing new trends in the Palestinian economy revealing that a Palestinian state,
independent of the current occupation regime, could function and even flourish
economically.
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In its 2011 assessment, the IMF concluded “the PA is now able to conduct
the sound economic policies expected of a future well-functioning Palestinian
state, given its solid track record in reforms and institution-building in the public
finances and financial areas.”202 The IMF cited reforms undertaken by the
Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) to improve Palestinian monetary
governance internationally and domestically. Internationally, the PMA
established a regulatory framework that was on track to implementing the Basel
Accords.203 This is important because the Basel Accords establishes a global
norm for managing capital and assessing how well banking systems are able to
function amid risk and fluctuation. By adopting reforms towards implementing
this framework, the PMA is establishing for itself an international presence of a
Palestinian entity in the global political economy.
The PMA has also implemented domestic reforms that improved the
ability of the Palestinian Authority and its financial institutions to manage internal
monetary exchanges. According to the IMF, the PMA has established a modern
payment infrastructure, engaged in a cooperative relationship with the Bank of
Israel, and has enacted new legislation to strengthen the financial legal framework
in the West Bank. These reforms have lead to greater efficiency within monetary
institutions, decreased risk, and legal mechanism for monitoring the
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implementation of Basel initiatives.204 As a result, the PMA as a financial
institution under the Palestinian Authority acts in the same manner the Bank of
Israel does in Israel and the Federal Reserve does in the United States. This is an
important metric for understanding whether or not the Palestinian Authority could
govern a sovereign state in Palestine because it reveals that the Palestinian
Authority is actively working with external actors, in concert with internal
financial networks, to allow the Palestinian Authority to engage in normalized
monetary practices that impact the ability of a government to effectively govern.
While the IMF has found that institutional reforms has given the
Palestinian Authority the capacity to formulate economic policy, a lack of
implementation of initiatives spelled out in formal agreements with Israel have
not been implemented to the fullest extent that would enable Palestine to act on its
latent economic potential. The most recent development agreement facilitated by
the Quartet included an agreement to open ports in Gaza for the export of West
Bank goods to international markets.205 This has not transpired, which has
furthered to stymie private sector growth in the West Bank.206 Another factor
impacting further Palestinian growth is the system of clearance transfers that
exists between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. With nearly three-quarters of
the Palestinian Authority’s budgetary revenues coming from duties collected on
behalf of the Palestinian Authority by Israel, the Palestinian Authority is severely
handicapped by volatilities in Israeli policy.207 As a result, the transfer of customs
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duties is a tool repeatedly used by Israel to force the Palestinian Authority to
capitulate to Israel’s political demands and to cause continued undue stress on the
Palestinian Authority’s economy.208 Implementation of already agreed upon
reforms, as well as providing more Palestinian autonomy over territory in the
West Bank, would give the Palestinian Authority a greater degree of economic
sovereignty. These factors, however, can only be implemented by Israel, which
will not gain traction so long as Israel can continue to benefit—politically and
economically—from the current status quo.
While the 2011 IMF report largely addressed the development of the
monetary policy in the Palestinian Authority, the latest World Bank report, issued
in April 2012, addresses fiscal and trade policy. Like the IMF, the World Bank
also concluded that security restrictions imposed by Israel on the West Bank
continue to prevent economic growth. The World Bank cites that private sector
investment is necessary for economic growth; however, security restrictions
discourage private sector investment while also necessitating foreign donor aid to
keep the Palestinian Authority economy from total collapse.209 The World Bank
indicates 2007 as a significant turning point in the Palestinian Authority’s
development when Prime Minister Fayyad’s “Caretaker Government” presented
an institution-building agenda in Paris. This led to an increase in aid from the
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international community, allowing the state building program to commence,
leading to initial economic growth.210
According to the World Bank, corruption is no longer a significant
constraint on private sector development in the West Bank.211 This is an
important indicator of the Palestinian Authority’s capacity to govern an
independent state due to the role corruption and nepotism played in internally
undermining state building efforts during the Oslo period. The World Bank also
argues that reforms have successfully improved the judiciary system over recent
years.212 The improved ability to manage and appropriately adjudicate cases
fosters a good environment for business, as the judiciary is no longer seen as an
impediment to growth.213 Overall, the World Bank argues that the Palestinian
Authority’s financial system is “able to meet the needs of the private sector.”214
While the Palestinian Authority’s management of the economy is by no means
perfect or ideal, there has been a consistent effort over the last five years to build
the capacity of Palestinian institutions.
The World Bank cites two major factors impeding the Palestinian
Authority’s institution building initiative. Although the rejuvenation of donor aid
in 2007 initially led to growth in the economy, the Palestinian Authority economy
has turned the Palestinian Authority into a quasi-rentier state. The recurrent
budget—the expenditures appropriated for administrative operations—
necessitates most of the Palestinian Authority’s internal revenue, squeezing out
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funding for investment. As a result, development is totally development on donor
funding,215 and with donor funds now financing recurrent budget expenditures as
well. The Palestinian Authority could certainly benefit from further
administrative reforms that enable the domestic fiscal policy to reorient the
economy towards development, however, with the Palestinian Authority already
taxing what it can to the maximum, the only alternative to genuine internal
revenue is reliance on foreign aid. The Palestinian Authority could be able to
restructure its economy and commit more revenues towards investments if there is
a formal establishment of a sovereign state and the removal of restrictions that
would enable the Palestinian Authority to adequately generate tax revenues.216
Although the heavy reliance on foreign aid and the subsequent structure of
the current economy have stymied further growth, the World Bank argues that the
main limitation on private sector led development is the continuation of
restrictions imposed on the Palestinian Authority by Israel.217 With the advent of
the second intifada, the Israeli Defense Forces manned roadblocks inside the West
Bank, making it impossible to move internally.218 The World Bank accounts for
the reduction (although not complete removal) of roadblocks in the West Bank,
however, a major impediment to Palestinian sovereignty and economic growth is
the absence of territorial integrity over Palestinian land in the West Bank. The
Oslo process was designed to facilitate a transfer of land from full Israeli civil and
military control to complete Palestinian control by the Palestinian Authority.
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Israel continues to claim control over Area C, which constitutes 60 percent of
Palestinian land in the West Bank. This is a major barrier to private sector
development, and even the expansion of the jurisdiction of government
institutions, due to a sheer lack of land available for development.219 The World
Banks suggests that improving the Palestinian Land Authority’s (PLA) ability to
register public lands and better manage resources on those lands,220 however,
without full civil authority in Areas B and C, the PLA is still subjugated to the
Israeli law and Israel’s judiciary system.221 This not only limits private
development projects, but also the exploitation of water aquifers under Palestinian
land and the improvement of physical and communication infrastructure that
would benefit private sector development and the capacity of Palestinian
institutions to function at their fullest potential. While restrictions have
significantly decreased from the intifada period, there has been no improvement
in ceding Palestinian territory to Palestinian institutions, and there likely will not
be one independent of a political settlement.
As shown in both the IMF and World Bank reports, the Palestinian
Authority has the capacity to function as the government of an independent state,
however, the occupation regime that is maintained by the State of Israel creates
significant barriers to full sovereignty. The absence of the implementation of
Oslo initiatives that would open the Palestinian economy to global markets and
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return territorial sovereignty to Palestinian institutions continues to impede the
statehood process. In the absence of full implementation of these reforms, the
Palestinian Authority has developed its central banking system, building
confidence in the business sector, as well as introduced a new, reform-oriented
government in 2007, hailing confidence from the international community
through the implementation of donor aid to fund institution-building projects.
While the state-building program has not produced a fully independent Palestinian
state, it has led to greater scrutiny from the international community to ascertain
the capacity of the Palestinian Authority to transition into statehood.

Petition at the UN
Reports produced by external actors are important in assessing the current
capabilities of the Palestinian Authority because they identify specific successes
and failures of the present Palestinian leadership. More important than reports,
however, is the actual reception and recognition of the Palestinian Authority as a
peer state in the international system because it shows how Palestine, as an
independent state, could improve, or detract from, the current concert of states.
In May 2011, Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, published an
editorial in the New York Times, indicating that the Palestinian Authority would
pursue an alternative route to statehood, particularly through the international
community. To justify his position, President Abbas cited that the Palestinian
Authority had, in fact, met the criteria laid forth at Montevideo:
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“Despite Israel’s attempts to deny us our long-awaited membership
in the community of nations, we have met all prerequisites to
statehood listed in the Montevideo Convention…the permanent
population of our land is the Palestinian people, whose right to
self-determination has been repeatedly recognized by the United
Nations, and by the International Court of Justice in 2004. Our
territory is recognized as the lands framed by the 1967 border,
though it is occupied by Israel. We have the capacity to enter into
relations with other states and have embassies and missions in
more than 100 countries.”222
According to the declarative theory of statehood, Palestine could be a state, as it
suffices the aforementioned criteria that the modern understanding of what makes
a state an actual state.
In September 2011, President Abbas first petitioned UN member states for
the recognition of a full state. This initial attempt failed to come to fruition, as it
required UN Security Council approval.223 A year later, Palestine returned to the
UN again, this time seeking nonmember observer status, which did not require a
vote by the Security Council. The recent attempt to obtain statehood through the
UN is important because it serves as an indicator as to whether or not other states
also believe that Palestine constitutes a state. With 130 member states voting in
favor of upgrading Palestine’s status, it is clear that an overwhelming majority of
states in the current international system support an independent Palestinian state.
In the absence of tangible results from the Abbas’s statehood bid at the
UN, Palestinians in the West Bank have become to express their discontent with
the Palestinian Authority over the course of the past year. A major problem
affecting Palestinians over the past year has been an increase in taxes and the
Palestinian Authority’s inability to pay public sector wages. As previously,
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mentioned, part of the institutional reforms included expanding the tax base. In
order to meet its budgetary obligations, the Palestinian Authority expanded its
domestic sources of revenue by increasing taxes, and in some cases, doubled the
amounts of taxes owed by the richest Palestinians. Business leaders criticized the
Palestinian Authority by citing that high taxes hurt business and stifle
investment.224 Unable to raise sufficient domestic revenues and shortcomings in
donor aid contributed to a large financial crisis in 2012, leaving the Palestinian
Authority unable to pay public sector wages. As the public sector is the largest
employer in the West Bank, the inability of the Palestinian Authority to pay
wages in full and on time has had strong consequences on the entire Palestinian
economy. 225
With worsening economic conditions on the ground in the West Bank,
many Palestinians have taken to the streets, much like their brethren in the rest of
the Arab world. Much of the blame for rising prices and wage freezes has been
directed at Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who lacks domestic political
legitimacy. While the Israeli occupation is one of the main contributors to the
economic woes in the West Bank, some Palestinians feel that the Palestinian
Authority is cooperating with the Israeli occupation too much, acting like a proxy
to the occupation regime without Israel bearing the financial burden of
administering the West Bank.226 In September 2012, protests focused in Hebron
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and were carried out in response to an increase in prices that coincided with
austerity measures enacted as the Palestinian Authority attempted to decreases its
expenditures.227 While the protests continue to pose an internal challenge to the
Palestinian Authority and threaten to destabilize an already volatile region, the
protests themselves are not as violent as they could be. The Palestinian security
forces have been successful in containing protests while maintaining their
professional demeanor.228 This is important to note because just a few years ago
an internal Palestinian security force would not have had the authority or the
capability to manage domestic protests.
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Conclusion
Since the end of the second intifada in 2005, the Palestinian Authority has
actively worked to produce a viable state in the West Bank. The Palestinian
Authority’s 2011-2012 UN bid challenges the continuation of Israel’s occupation
regime in the West Bank by presenting the argument that Palestine is able to be an
independent state and is viewed as such by the majority of states in the United
Nations. The purpose of this research is to determine what criteria a state-like
entity needs to possess in order to obtain full statehood. As demonstrated in a
theoretical analysis and a case study analysis, this research concludes that a state
needs to have a centralized government with an administrative bureaucracy; a
monopoly on the use of force; defined territory with a permanent population;
recognition from the international community; the ability to conduct foreign
relations with other states; and, finally, a legitimate claim to sovereignty. The
purpose of this study was not to provide a definitive solution to the conflict or
navigate the political environment, but rather, the purpose of this research is to
determine what institutions the Palestinian Authority has and if they function as
an anticipated.
To assess these functions, this study argues that determining the
institutional capacity of the state is the best way for the current international
system to differentiate between states and non-states. Institutional capacity, as
argued by political scientist Francis Fukuyama, is understood as the scope and
strength of the state, particularly a state’s ability to implement the appropriate
institutions necessary to enable the government to execute the functions of the
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state. By analyzing the government plans produced by the Palestinian Authority,
under the leadership of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, one can see that the PA is
taking an active role to develop institutions and improve existing ones.
Comparing the Palestine Reform and Development Plan, 2008-2010 to the
National Development Plan, 2011-2013 illustrates the a targeted scope of PA
activity in the West Bank, as well as areas of successful implementation of
institutional reforms over the last five years. These government programs
indicate that the Palestinian Authority is actively undergoing reforms to develop
its institutional capacity, in the anticipation of sovereign statehood. Palestine is a
unique case in this regard because its leaders have been actively reforming the
administration in spite of a military occupation and the absence of a domestic
political system.
The caveat to this assessment, however, is the continuation of Israel’s
occupation in the West Bank. As external studies conducted by the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund indicate, the Palestinian Authority has
reached a glass ceiling to further development, a result of the Israeli occupation.
Realizing that private sector growth is key to the longevity of the Palestinian
Authority, any development outside of Area A or integration with international
markets is otherwise impossible so long as Israel continues to limit the civil and
economic authorities of the Palestinian Authority. The 2011-2012 UN bid is
significant in this regard because it has demonstrated that the international
community supports an independent Palestine while implicitly condemning the
continuation of harsh restrictions in the West Bank. Despite an external
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occupation in the West Bank, the premise of this argument remains the same—the
Palestinian Authority, on its own accord, has actively engaged in institution
building measures that improve its institutional capacity to function as an
independent state. The Palestinian Authority now needs the support of Israel and
the United States to continue building institutions.
Although the scope of this study is deep, there are limitations of this study
and areas that could be improved. One of the main limitations of this study is that
it intentionally omitted the political and social aspects of institution building. On
the political side, this study did not look at political fragmentation within the
larger Palestinian polity and it did not consider Hamas’s opposition government
in the Gaza Strip. This decision was made to give a greater voice to the
institutional building programs by the Palestinian Authority and the immediate
potential of coming to an agreement between Israel-Palestine, exclusively in the
West Bank. On the social side, this study also neglects to look at the role that
NGOs and localized social movements play in realizing Palestinian statehood.
Keeping the Arab Spring in mind, another volume on this topic of institution
building could be written from the perspective of social movements and
organizations within civil society that execute some of the welfare roles that a
strong state might otherwise execute. In order to provide a well-developed study
on Palestine’s quest for statehood, this study chose to exclusively analyze the
Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and its institution-building program from
the a more technical perspective, rather than predominately political or social.
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While the purpose of this study was to look at the Palestinian Authority to
understand whether or not it has the institutional capacity to become a state, the
implications of this research are far reaching. One question this study raises is
whether or not certain criteria for statehood, such as defined borders, ought to
impinge on overall acceptance as a state. States like Cyprus, India, Pakistan, the
Republic of Korea, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea all have
borders that are ceasefire and armistice lines. If these states exist as states with
part of their borders represented by a mutually agreed upon ceasefire line, why is
the 1967 borders between Israel and the West Bank unsatisfactory in meeting this
requirement? The issue of territorial integrity also comes to mind when looking
at Cyprus considering the division of Cyprus between Turkish and Greek
jurisdictions along the ceasefire line.
Another issue raised by this discussion on institutional capacity is the role of
failed and failing states vis-à-vis emerging state entities, like the Palestinian
Authority. States like Yemen, where tribal rulers and non-state actors challenge
the administrative authority of the central government, or Iraq, who was occupied
by a foreign army for over a decade, are considered failed states in the 2012
Failed States Index, however, they are still recognized as states nonetheless. If
these states are unable to execute the functions of a state argued in this paper or
consistently fulfill the requirements for statehood, why are they recognized as
states when Palestine is not? These specific examples and particular questions
ought to be nuanced further in additional volumes of research, however, they
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adequately illustrate the fact that the accepted criteria for statehood are not
applied to all states and state-aspiring entities on an equal basis.
Continuous change in the Middle East necessitates the issue of statehood be
addressed prudently in the aftermath of the UN bid. With the General Assembly’s
vote recognizing Palestine’s popular right to sovereignty, Israel and the United
States are becoming increasingly isolated. Protests in neighboring countries as
well as domestic protests targeting grievances against the Palestinian Authority
threaten to undermine the state-building program that has taken place over the
past several years. The recent resignation of Prime Minister Fayyad, while not
unraveling reforms, shows the limitations that individual leaders face when trying
to promote active change on the ground. Assessing the Palestinian Authority
from a lens of institutional capacity rather than political readiness demonstrates
that the institutional framework for Palestinian sovereignty is in place, and
continuous reforms over the last half-decade suggest that the Palestinian
Authority is not only building new institutions but improving on existing ones.
Going forward, this framework could replace the defunct Oslo process by
understanding what it means to become a state, regardless of political propriety.
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Appendix I
The following are excerpts from interviews conducted in Israel and the West
Bank from December 29, 2012-January 8, 2013. Comments given by
interviewees are organized by question topic. All interviews have been coded for
non-attribution. Special thanks to the Renee Crown Honors Program and the
Crown Scholar fund for enabling me to conduct field interviews.
What is the current security situation in the West Bank?
Interview #5: Security is the most important and economy is tied to
security…roadblocks used to promote security but impeded economic
development. Security is the most important yet it is the only area where any
progress has been maintained (referring to removal of roadblocks in Nablus in
2009).
Interview #7: The main [security] issue in Palestine is human security…not
borders, checkpoints.
Interview #8: The security situation has two dimensions…internally secure
because there is active police…externally insecure because of Israel.
Interview #10: After Abbas was elected, a campaign was initiated for militias to
give up weapons and become part of PA security force. Now all security is
controlled by PA security forces with help of U.S. and EU. The financial crisis is
threatening security because officers and soldiers are not being paid…there is a
risk that they might not obey PA authority [if they are not paid]. PA focused on
security because it thought that [security] was the most important…if you control
security you control all other situations.
What is the state of the occupation in the West Bank?
Interview #3: Israel controls resources that the PA should be distributing…water,
electric, and 3G.
Interview #8: [PA] can’t control resources because of occupation…Israel controls
everything…PA planning is good but needs control to implement plans.
Interview #9: Israel uses occupation to affect Palestinian markets…intentionally
done to benefit Israel. Israel doesn’t allow 3G access which makes
communication difficult.
What needs to be done to restructure the economy to focus on private sectorled growth? What is the PA doing to decrease dependence on external aid?
Interview #3: Our project was funded by al-Masri who invested in infrastructure
rather than the operating costs…the investor sees the fruits of his investment
rather than not knowing how exactly the money is spent.
Interview #4: The system, transparency, departments all built by Fayyad…the
structure [for a state] is in place…but there is no focus on economics or
investment…Israeli’s income is three times more than Palestinians, but
Palestinians pay Israeli prices.

96

Interview #7: Economic development is completely under Israeli control…Israel
controls the means of development…PA can’t exploit land and settlements are
Israeli land grab
Interview #9: Need strategy because Israelis control economics…30 percent of
production in Palestine meets needs of the people…70 percent has to be imported
[from Israel (per Paris Accords)]…there are no strategic stores, no industrial
infrastructure, no strategic economic development form PA. Palestinians can’t
ensure security of investment because Israel controls economic
environment…you need permission from Israel to export or important certain
goods…Israel uses security to benefit [their own] industries. Villages need more
economic development but [the villages (mostly in Areas B & C)] need Israeli
permission [to develop]. There is no room for industrial zone in Area A; Israel
doesn’t allow industrial zone in Areas B and C.
What do President Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu need to do on their end
to empower the Palestinian Authority?
Interview #2: Obama has potential to act now that he is not shackled by
elections…John Kerry will likely lead new peace talks as he has leeway to act on
foreign affairs while the president is focused on internal economics.
Interview #3: There are two problems facing the PA: the Israeli government and
the White House
Interview #4: Israel and the U.S. must say yes to a state for it to be a state. The
U.S. donates to the Palestinian people through infrastructure, education, water,
security…the U.S. is engaged with NGOs and locally…not politically.
Interview #5: Israel benefits from the PA…PA manages Palestinian people, pays
salaries, provides security…[with the growth of the PA] Israel isn’t responsible
for this anymore.
Interview #7: Need real American involvement. U.S. veto was [Israel’s] only
protection in international community and UN…[the U.S.] must allow sanctions
against Israel. Israel needs to clearly end occupation. The U.S. needs to stop
sabotaging international pressure…the U.S. is on top in the UN…U.S. can’t use
hegemonic position to sabotage role in conflict…needs to join [consensus of]
international community.
Interview #8: Full withdrawal of occupation is needed [from Israel]…two states
for two people is needed from President Obama.
Interview #10: This U.S. president is crucial for Palestinians…he will determine
future U.S. involvement in peace process…Palestinians will lose trust if U.S.
doesn’t change.
Interview #14: The security paradigm dictates Bibi’s policies even though the
majority [of Israelis] support two-state solution. The only way to challenge
[Bibi’s] security paradigm is to offer a credible alternative political platform (in
Israel’s domestic political system).
How does the rift between Hamas and Fatah affect the state-building
program?
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Interview #2: Hamas won politically [referring to Operation Pillar of
Defense]…Abbas won diplomatically at the UN…the PLO needs to be
restructured basked on power sharing.
Interview #10: Fatah-led demonstrations in West Bank show that people are
aware Fatah can organize…has gained Fatah more respect, more publicity.
What is your opinion of President Abbas’s 2011 attempt to pursue statehood
in the UN?
Interview #2: It’s a diplomatic process where Israel needs to be forced into a
willing partner
Interview #8: The PA is a virtual state…built on paper not in reality. UN bid
recognizes PA under occupation not as a sovereign state.
What is your opinion of Salam Fayyad’s state-building program?
Interview #4: Fayyad’s policy is self-sustaining…the problem is that the PA can’t
provide self-sustainability. Another problem is that Fayyad is not grounded in
Fatah and is politically weak.
Interview #5: The organization infrastructure is already in place…need capable
leadership and political framework to see institutions reach their full potential.
Interview #10: Fayyad employed a lot of people, half in security, half in
[government] administration.
Interview #11: Education is the largest institutions…employs most people in the
public sector.
Interview #12: Arafat paid salaries to underqualified employees, resulted in
bloating of public sector and created a buffer for Arafat’s own leadership. [Under
Afarat] there had been a problem with politicization of individual authority…lack
of professionalism of leadership positions…someone would call Ministry of
Finance, instead of answering “Ministry of Finance how can I help you?”
secretaries would answer “this is so and so how can I help you”…individuals
became associated with certain ministries.
What do you think are the future prospects for peace?
Interview #2: The Arab Peace Initiative should be the cornerstone for future
progress. This was originally a Saudi plan, however, the Saudis have been
hesitant to lead…if the king of Saudi Arabia engaged with Israel, this would be a
major breakthrough.
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Appendix II
Excerpted from: Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010: 23-28.

3.

The Palestinian National Policy Agenda

The Palestinian National Policy Agenda is a framework of national policy goals
and supporting objectives which set out the priorities for the PNA over the
medium term. It is the guiding policy framework for the PRDP, to provide: a
clear rationale for the activities of ministries, agencies, and other public bodies; a
basis for establishing priorities in the allocation of financial resources; and, a
forward-looking agenda for Palestinian development and for reforming
Palestinian institutions. The PNPA was prepared by consolidating existing PNA
policy and plans into a single integrated framework, and was adopted by the
Council of Ministers on 10th September 2007.
The PNPA framework is based on the substantial research, analysis, consultation
and planning carried out in recent years. This includes the MTDPs for 2005-2007
and 2006-2008, the Strategic Economic Plan 2006-2008, the Palestinian Private
Sector Resilience and Recovery Plan, the Urgent Plan for Dealing with the
Emergency Situation, the Quick Recovery Program July-December 2007, MAS’s
report Towards Formulating a Palestinian Development Vision, and the
development plans of a number of ministries including Education and Higher
Education, Agriculture and Health.

3.1 Guiding Principles and Vision Statement
The PNPA focuses on what the government seeks to achieve on behalf of the
Palestinian people over the next three years, as a basis for determining the most
effective and efficient allocation of the funding available from domestic and
international sources. In recognition of the unique context in which the PNA
operates, and the challenges and limitations it faces, the formulation of the PNPA
was guided by four fundamental principles.
• It is the intention of the PNA to support and sustain, through all of its
policies and programs, the steadfast determination of the Palestinian
people to remain on their land and to continue to pursue their livelihoods,
not succumbing to the pressures placed upon them by the Occupation. The
PNA will give priority in the short term to the provision of humanitarian
relief, by its own agencies and by other national and international bodies,
to those most urgently in need as result of the measures imposed by the
Occupation. However, its policies and programs will be designed to
support the transition from relief to development as the principal focus of
activity and expenditure at the earliest opportunity.
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•

The policies and programs of the PNA will be directed towards the ending
of the Occupation and the establishment of an independent, viable
sovereign state. Since its formation in 1994 the PNA has pursued a
process of institutional development and state-building leading towards
statehood. Despite the political, economic and fiscal crises that have arisen
since 2000, as a result of the collapse of the peace process this remains its
undisputed direction of development.

•

The eventual Palestinian state must be able to exist securely on the preJune 1967 borders, including East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank, and be capable of protecting its citizens and their land and property
from incursion, confiscation and destruction, in accordance with
international law. The Palestinian people have suffered not only from the
expropriation of their land due to Israeli settlement policy and the further
annexation of significant areas of land by the Separation Wall, but also
from repeated military incursions which have led to the damage or
destruction of large parts of their infrastructure, including housing units,
schools and roads.

•

The eventual Palestinian state will be founded on democratic and
pluralistic principles and humanistic values. Its institutions will protect
human rights, religious tolerance and the rule of law, promote gender
equality, create an enabling environment for a free and open market
economy, and serve the needs of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups,
enabling all citizens to fulfill their potential.

The PNPA is also based on the following vision statement:
“Palestine is an independent Arab state with sovereignty over the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip on the pre-June 1967 occupation borders and with East Jerusalem
as its capital. Palestine is a stable democratic state that respects human rights and
guarantees equal rights and duties for all citizens. Its people live in a safe and
secure environment under the rule of law and it promotes equality between men
and women. It is a state which values highly its social capital, social coherence
and solidarity, and identifies itself with Arab Palestinian culture, humanistic
values and religious tolerance. It is a progressive state that values cordial
relationships with other states and people in the global community. The
Palestinian government is open, inclusive, transparent and accountable. It is
responsive to citizens’ needs, delivers basic services effectively, and creates an
enabling environment for a thriving private sector. Palestine’s human resources
are the driving force for national development. The Palestinian economy is open
to other markets around the world and strives to produce high value-added,
competitive goods and services, and, over the long term, to be a knowledge-based
economy.”
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3.2 Structure and Contents of the PNPA
3.2.1 Structure
The PNPA framework consists of a logical hierarchy comprising three levels:
goals, objectives and policy areas. This is designed to clarify the rationale and
priority of all government activities (and hence expenditure) and, in particular,
how they ultimately contribute to the achievement of high-level national
objectives. A graphic outline of the PNPA framework is attached at Annex 1.
The objectives and policy areas included in the PNPA have been limited to results
which are, at least in principle, achievable by the PNA. While working towards its
overarching goal of bringing about the end of the illegal Occupation, the PNPA
will deal with internal goals and objectives that are at least to some degree under
the influence of the PNA. The PNPA will focus on practical objectives for the
purposes of planning how the resources of the government should be allocated
over the medium term.
However, the priorities of the PNPA are shaped to a large extent by the facts and
consequences of the Occupation. For example, the need for the reconstruction or
rehabilitation of destroyed infrastructure, or to counter the effects of the loss of
lives and the loss of freedom, and of the loss of access to land, water or
educational and health facilities. These realities are reflected not so much in the
high-level objectives as in the specific objectives and instruments proposed for
individual policy areas. Here, they shape both the proposed government activities
and the operational constraints on economical and efficient service delivery.
3.2.2 National Goals
The national goals represent the long-term aspirations and intentions of the
Palestinian people and the PNA. They cannot be achieved in three years, and their
full realisation depends on the achievement of independent statehood and the end
of the Occupation. However, progress towards the attainment of these goals is
possible in the next three years even under adverse circumstances.
The national goals express the highest-level purposes of the PNA, all of which are
regarded as equally important, and to which all public sector activities will be
linked. They provide a clear indication of the principal priorities for national
reform and development in the short, medium and long term, and will inform all
policy-making, planning and budgeting processes. All other elements of the
PNPA are directly linked to the achievement of these goals.

Table 3.1 National goals
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Safety and security: a society subject to law
and order, which provides a safe and secure
environment in which the people of Palestine
can raise their families and pursue their
livelihoods and businesses, free from crime,
disorder and the fear of violence

Good governance: a system of democratic
governance characterized by participation of
citizens, respect for the rule of law and separation
of powers, capable of administering natural
resources and delivering public services
efficiently, effectively and responsively, and
supported by a stable legal framework, a robust
legislative process and accountable, honest and
transparent institutions which protect the rights of
all citizens

Increased national prosperity: economic
security, stability, viability and self-reliance,
achieved through an increase in sustainable
employment and an equitable distribution of
resources, leading to the reduction and
eventual eradication of poverty and the
growth of individual and national wealth

Enhanced quality of life: increases in material
wealth and environmental quality are matched by
the strengthening of social coherence and
solidarity, so that the most vulnerable areas and
groups in society continue to be supported and the
culture, national identity and heritage of the
Palestinian people are reinforced

3.3.3 Objectives
The objectives set out in the PNPA describe the results that must be delivered – or
obstacles that must be overcome – in order to achieve the national goals. They are
more specific than the national goals, and progress towards them can be measured
using agreed indicators, subject to quantitative targets, for the delivery of results
over time.
Objectives are on two levels, primary and intermediate. Primary objectives
contribute directly to the attainment of national goals.

Table 3.2 Primary objectives
In support of Safety and security:
• Strengthen the civil and criminal justice
system
• Increase the professionalism, accountability
and effectiveness of the security services

In support of Good governance:
• Enhance the efficiency and effectiveness
of government
• Strengthen public institutions

In support of Increased national prosperity:
• Move towards fiscal stability

In support of Enhanced quality of life:
• Reinforce social coherence
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• Restore economic growth

• Provide social protection for those in need

Intermediate objectives represent significant intermediate milestones in progress
towards delivering the primary objectives. For example, the creation of an
enabling environment for private sector development, leading to an increase in
employment opportunities, is presented as an essential precondition for economic
growth, rather than as a primary objective in its own right.
Table 3.3 Intermediate objectives
• Develop human and physical capital through the provision of basic services in
education, health and housing, and facilitate the growth of private sector
enterprise as a source of sustainable employment, in order to establish the
conditions for economic growth
• Develop the social capital of the nation, and preserve its culture and heritage, in
order to reinforce social coherence
• Strengthen local government, as a major contributor to improvements in
governance
• Slim down the PNA, leading to a reduction in costs and especially in the wage
bill, as an essential prerequisite for the achievement of fiscal stability

3.3.4 Policy areas
Policy areas are specific topic areas in which the need for high-priority action is
needed in order to support the achievement of objectives and national goals. They
do not necessarily coincide with the boundaries of particular organisations or
established programs. Some may represent only one part of a ministry or agency’s
responsibilities; some may require cross-cutting action by a number of bodies.
However, ministries and agencies must be able to specify which of the policy
areas their planned activities fit into and demonstrate their contribution to national
goals and objectives.
It is at this level of the PNPA framework that detailed policy formulation is
located. A policy is not simply an objective, but a statement both of what is to be
achieved and how. The quality of policy making depends crucially on careful and
realistic thinking at the ministry and agency level, based on the best evidence
available, about what interventions are most likely to deliver the specified
objective and about the risks of undesirable unintended consequences.

3.3 Linkage between the PNPA and the PRDP
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The PNPA was used as the starting point for policy-making, planning and
budgeting by all ministries and agencies. Ministries and agencies, through their
Planning & Budgeting (P&B) submissions, provided the detailed information
about the specific objectives being pursued, and the activities and projects being
undertaken, in each policy area. Ministries and agencies were required to
demonstrate how their own specific objectives and activities contribute towards
the achievement of the national priorities, and to identify the level of resources
dedicated to each activity. This enabled an assessment of the extent to which
activities and resource allocations are aligned with national policy priorities. The
information produced by ministries and agencies also covered all different types
of expenditure (recurrent, capital and development) so that the full costs of
undertaking different activities can be evaluated.
The P&B submissions from ministries and agencies were analysed and reviewed
to ensure that directions being pursued by ministries are fully aligned with the
national goals and objectives; that important activities that would contribute
significantly to those objectives in the medium term are not omitted or unfunded;
and, that objectives are clearly formulated. The review process also ensured that
cross-cutting linkages, where activities contribute to objectives that are principally
the responsibility of other bodies, were fully recognised and exploited.
Application of the PNPA in developing the PRDP was, in effect, an important
first step on the path to reforming policy-making, planning and budgeting
processes. In future years it is expected that there will be a more extended
timetable for planning and budgeting, which will allow (as is normal practice) the
process to begin with a stage of policy review. This will enable a thorough review
of the existing government policies, consideration to be given to the impact,
prioritisation and the continuing appropriateness of policies before attention is
turned to the allocation of financial resources. In the future, continued application
of the PNPA framework will drive the realignment of public sector activities and
resources with national goals and objectives, and it will provide a much stronger
basis for reviewing the performance of ministries and agencies in achieving their
objectives and targets.
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Appendix III
The follow maps illustrates the number of states that recognize Palestine and
Kosovo as independent
independent.. Also included is a map of states that do not currently
recognize Israel:

States that recognize upgraded status of Palestine, November 2012

States that formally recognize Kosovo independence, 2013
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Map of states that do not recognize the State of Israel, 2012
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Summary
State 194: Assessing the Institutional Capacity of the Palestinian Authority
as the Foundation for an Independent State
Amanda Claypool
Project Summary
In a May 2011 editorial in the New York Times, Palestinian Authority President
Mahmoud Abbas publicly announced that the Palestinian Authority would seek to
attain full recognition as an independent and sovereign state during the UN
General Assembly’s annual September gathering. While Abbas garnered an
overwhelming amount of support from the majority of UN Member States, the
decision to make Palestine a state in the UN was left to the Security Council.
With the U.S. promising to veto any attempt at statehood, Abbas’s attempt to
achieve Palestinian independence floundered in the Security Council.
Last fall, Abbas returned to the UN, this time seeking an upgrade to non-member
observer status, which only required a vote in the General Assembly. With 138 of
the 193 recognized UN Member States voting in favor of the Palestinian
Authority, it became apparent that the international community supports an
independent Palestine.
As this process was taking place, several important questions became apparent
despite the political immediacy of Abbas’s gambit in relation to the “Middle East
peace process.” In today’s international system, who decides who becomes a
state? Of those entities seeking status as states, what are the criteria they need to
possess to become a state? These questions created the framework for this
research on the Palestinian Authority.
This particular study hypothesized that a state could become a state depending on
the degree of its institutional capacity to govern and administer its citizens.
Institutional capacity, in this regard, is defined as the presence of strong
governmental institutions that can efficiently and effectively carry out the
administrative and bureaucratic needs of the state. Measuring the institutional
capacity of the Palestinian Authority became a good variable to use in this study
because it effectively eliminated the political realities that skew perceptions on
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Palestine’s ability to operate as an independent
state. This was determined after an internship experience at a Palestinian
advocacy firm in Washington, D.C. where I became familiar with Palestinian
Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and his policy of institution building.
In the four years leading up to Abbas’s first attempt in the UN, the Palestinian
Authority had actively worked to build government institutions that would
demonstrate to the international community that Palestine was ready to become a
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state of its own. Receiving public accolades from state leaders and recognition
from notable international organizations, like the World Bank and the IMF,
Fayyad’s institution building program was regarded as a great success. Even with
international support, however, Fayyad’s reforms have been insufficient in
producing a sovereign Palestinian state. Again, this raises the question: who
decides who becomes a state and by what standards it decided?
To answer this question and determine whether or not Palestine has the capability
to be an independent state, this study used a qualitative analysis by looking at
classical and contemporary theories on what makes a state a state, comparing
historical examples of states that emerged in similar conditions as the Palestinian
Authority faces now, and personal interviews with individuals who experienced
the state-building program in the West Bank. The first section of the study looked
at the theoretical basis for statehood. The classical theory component considered
works by Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Tocqueville to understand what were
some of the first understandings of statehood from a period of time when
independence was a new concept. Likewise, the contemporary theory section
looked at international norms and current scholarship to understand how
statehood was understood during this period when decolonization and the collapse
of the Soviet Union produced the largest amount of new states in a single point in
time. This section concluded that there are certain criteria a state needs to posses,
such as sovereignty and a territory with defined borders; however, these criteria
are based in international norms and tradition and are not fixed standards.
The second section of the paper utilized a case study analysis to understand how
states emerging from conflict zones became independent. This study chose to
look at Yishuv Israel and Kosovo as two cases of study because of they
represented conditions similar to that of Palestine. In Yishuv Israel, a national
ideology led the Jews in Mandatory Palestine to begin to cultivate a unique
society there. The Jews, under the aegis of British authority, began to build
institutions that would support an independent Jewish state in Mandatory
Palestine once the British ceded its authority. After decades of building Jewish
institutions and conflict with the local Arab population, David Ben-Gurion
declared the State of Israel independent in the section of territory allocated to the
Jews in the 1947 UN partition plan. This is applicable to the Palestinian case
because Palestinians share a guiding belief of self-determination and the
realization of a Palestinian. As previously mentioned, the Palestinian Authority is
working to build institutions to prepare for statehood, just as the Jews of Yishuv
Israel did. Finally, the Palestinians declared their own independence, albeit in
exile, in 1988, and have again sought to declare their sovereignty by petitioning
the UN for the recognition of statehood in 2011. The question then arises then, if
the Jews of Yishuv Israel could declare themselves the State of Israel, why can’t
the Palestinian Authority declare itself the State of Palestine?
Kosovo was also an important case study to address because it demonstrated the
role that international organizations played in a process of guided institution

108

building after the end of the Kosovo War in 1999. Unlike Yishuv Israel, the
process of building institutions in Kosovo was multilateral, with the UN and
NATO leading in areas of administration and security. Like Palestine, Kosovo
declared its independence in 2008, and while its official recognition as a UN
Member State is disputed, 99 Member States have recognized its independence,
including the United States. Kosovo is a unique case because it is the first time
that the UN Secretariat took on the administrative functions of a state, essentially
acting as the regent government of Kosovo while the institution building process
was taking place. Kosovo set a precedent for what the UN could do in facilitating
the self-determination of populations enduring a foreign occupation.
The third section of the study analyzes the actual process of building the
institutional capacity of the Palestinian Authority. This was done by studying the
program plans released by the Palestinian Authority. Since 2007, the Palestinian
Authority has written four plans extrapolating the specific reforms, strategies, and
short- and long-term objectives the Palestinian Authority intends to accomplish.
While the government programs are seriously limited by their dependence on
external aid and a lack of response from Israel in minimizing its occupation of the
West Bank, the programs have been successfully implemented in administrative,
monetary, and security sectors. This section was also supplemented by official
assessments produced by the Council on Foreign Relations, World Bank, and
IMF, to determine how external examinations perceive institution building by the
Palestinian Authority. Although dated to 1999, the assessment produced by the
Council on Foreign Relations shows where the Palestinian Authority stood at the
conclusion of the five-year interim period during the Oslo process. The World
Bank and IMF assessments look at how the Palestinian Authority has developed
economically, since the beginning of the institution-building program in 2007.
Although the current Palestinian Authority could take greater measures to
improve its administrative and governing capabilities, it is a post-Arafat entity
that is not plagued by the same maladies that afflicted the Oslo era Palestinian
Authority, particularly institutionalized nepotism and concentrated authority in
the executive. In addition to this, the external assessments also recognize what
this study also concludes: Israel’s occupation regime is the greatest barrier to
further institution building. As the scope of the Palestinian Authority’s reform
plans have become more specialized to focus on tangible short-term goals rather
than abstract long-term ambitions, as well as affirmation by external assessments
that the Palestinian Authority has the capability to function as other states, it is
becoming increasingly difficult to continue to deny Palestinians their right to
statehood.
Does the Palestinian Authority have the institutional capacity to constitute a
Palestinian state? The short answer is yes, as demonstrated by the creation and
implementation of reforms laid out in Prime Minister Fayyad’s state-building
program. This conclusion is supplemented by assessments conducted by external
international organizations and by votes cast in the United Nations. The long
answer recognizes that Israel’s occupation regime, Hamas’s own claim to rule in
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Gaza, and the political environment, particularly the absence of elections, could
make the case that Palestine is not ready to be state. While these factors are
certainly important to recognize, this study looks exclusively at the Palestinian
Authority’s institutional capacity, specifically whether or not it has the institutions
it needs to be a state. Thus, the issue is not whether or not the institutions
function well, but rather, it’s whether the Palestinian Authority has the institutions
in the first place. This is where this study distinguishes itself from potential
criticism.
Although this study looks exclusively at the Palestinian Authority there are
important implications to consider for future study of the topic of statehood.
Could failed and failing states be stripped of their recognition as states if their
institutions do not function well? What makes Yemen—a state where local tribes
have more power than the central administration in Sana’a, and al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula challenges the sovereignty of the state—anymore of a state
than the Palestinian Authority? Do states with contested borders, such as North
and South Korea, Cyprus, India and Pakistan, and Pakistan and Afghanistan, meet
the same criteria for defined borders that the Palestinian Authority is expected to
meet? And then there is the question of sovereignty in the face of a foreign
occupation. The United States occupied both Japan and Germany after WWII in
the interests of national and international security; however, both states eventually
attained their independence once they were no longer a security threat to the
United States. Eight years since the last suicide bombing and four decades since
the last Arab invasion in Israel, can Palestinians, particularly those under the
Palestinian Authority’s rule, still be considered existential threats? These
questions will arise in the coming years as scholars become skeptical of the
current state of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. It is with great hope that this study
would contribute to a new conversation on settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
by looking at the functionality of statehood rather than the politics of the “Middle
East peace process.”
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